Africa-Press. <\/strong> <\/span>Tunisian\u2013American relations have recently seen noticeable diplomatic activity and frequent shuttle visits. This was reflected in repeated trips to Tunisia by the U.S. president\u2019s adviser for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, who visited the country twice within six months. What lies behind this growing U.S. interest in Tunisia\u2014and is it a partnership approach or an effort at containment?<\/p>\nThis recent U.S. focus on Tunisia cannot be understood in isolation from the fast-moving political shifts in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the African Sahel, as well as Washington\u2019s broader repositioning in the international system\u2014especially in regions where global competition for influence is intensifying, including Tunisia.<\/p>\n
Understanding the drivers of U.S. interest in Tunisia involves three dimensions. The first relates to Tunisia itself and its complex domestic political scene. Boulos\u2019s repeated visits evoke memories of Condoleezza Rice\u2019s visits during Zine El Abidine Ben Ali\u2019s rule, which often boiled down to recommendations and demands. Ben Ali did not pay attention to them, and it appears that Tunisia\u2019s current president, Kais Saied, likewise does not want to heed Boulos\u2019s recommendations, pressures, or demands. Part of the U.S. interest in Tunisia, therefore, looks more like pressure and demands than clear priorities; a sanctions proposal targeting Tunisia is reportedly under discussion in Congress.<\/p>\n
The second driver is Washington\u2019s effort to curb Russian and Chinese influence across North Africa in general and Tunisia in particular. The U.S. appears to want to start from Tunisia, viewing it as a political bloc with calculations different from, for example, Algeria and Morocco. The third dimension is drawing Tunisia into a distinctly American sphere of influence. In other words, U.S. interest in Tunisia is shaped by multiple political, economic, security, and strategic considerations\u2014especially given the timing of the visits and their regional context.<\/p>\n
Boulos\u2019s second visit to Tunisia comes amid rapid regional developments: the situation in Libya, which could further deteriorate, and the intensifying international competition for influence in North Africa between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other.<\/p>\n
His visit also took place as part of a broader tour that included several North African countries, suggesting it is tied to U.S. priorities that extend beyond Tunisia\u2019s internal situation to North Africa as a whole. U.S. interest in Tunisia is connected to Washington\u2019s broader pivot toward North Africa, yet Tunisia seems to be at the center of attention\u2014and at the heart of the storm.<\/p>\n
This is particularly so as Trump\u2019s focus has shifted toward multiple regions beyond Venezuela and Iran, and may extend to areas that are hard to predict, within a plan aimed at containing\u2014and halting\u2014Russian and Chinese expansion. Trump\u2019s approach appears to rely on containment rather than direct confrontation with Russia and China.<\/p>\n
Interpretations of Boulos\u2019s second visit have multiplied, even to the point of contradiction, particularly regarding its motivations. While Boulos met President Kais Saied during the first visit, the second visit was limited to a meeting with Tunisia\u2019s foreign minister only.<\/p>\n
One of the first visit\u2019s key signals was an openly visible tension: Boulos remained standing while the Tunisian president chose to invoke the killing, starvation, and destruction faced by Palestinians in Gaza, using it as an official Tunisian message to the U.S. administration.<\/p>\n
President Saied reportedly showed Boulos images depicting scenes of killing, starvation, and devastation in Gaza\u2014implying that U.S. support for what is happening there undermines Washington\u2019s claim to be a global advocate of democracy or a guardian of human rights. The anger appears to have been mutual, with each man provoking the other.<\/p>\n
In the context of the first visit, Boulos reportedly arrived with several demands linked to the first dimension mentioned earlier\u2014the complexities of Tunisia\u2019s domestic political landscape. Among the U.S. demands he carried were a resumption of democracy and a handover of power to young people. There also appears to have been an indirect U.S. message hinting that President Kais Saied should step down, which helps explain why tensions escalated to the point of angering Saied. Tunisia\u2019s presidency published a statement saying that \u201cTunisia stressed non-interference in the internal affairs of the region\u2019s countries,\u201d and that it had begun \u201creshaping its international alliances,\u201d in a reference to Iran, Russia, and China.<\/p>\n
During the second visit, Boulos did not meet the Tunisian president, suggesting that tensions had intensified and that the president was not interested in receiving him. The reason, the text argues, is U.S. pressure on Tunisia through what became known as the U.S. congressional initiative to \u201crestore democracy in Tunisia.\u201d The initiative was introduced by two lawmakers from both parties\u2014the Republican Joe Wilson and the Democrat G. Wilson Crow\u2014and submitted to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. It is pending referral to the House Foreign Affairs and Judiciary committees for discussion, as a step toward adoption and a plenary vote, before being sent to the Senate and then placed on U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s desk for signature.<\/p>\n
The initiative, the text says, contains serious provisions. It starts from the premise that President Saied\u2019s government is \u201cauthoritarian,\u201d violates human rights, and acts in ways that contradict the constitution. It therefore calls for restoring Tunisia\u2019s democracy and holding elections under the 2014 constitution, which Saied abolished. If the proposal is passed, Tunisia would face sanctions lasting four years, including harsh measures and strict penalties, at a time when the country is already struggling economically.<\/p>\n
Tunisian\u2013American tensions then deepened further. After the lawmakers\u2019 initiative, a U.S. congressional delegation visited Tunisia on August 28, 2025, and was received by Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali Nafti. Publicly, the visit was framed around investment and bilateral cooperation, but the unspoken agenda, according to Tunisian assessments, was that the delegation reiterated U.S. demands related to democracy. In this reading, Washington concluded that President Saied had pushed out Tunisian politicians close to the United States\u2014meaning what is happening is not partnership, but pressure and leverage.<\/p>\n
Repeated U.S. visits to Tunisia do not necessarily indicate a positive interest, nor do they mean the relationship is based on equality. The dynamic is portrayed as closer to tutelage and dictates than to partnership or containment: Washington is dissatisfied with Tunisia\u2019s growing closeness to China and Russia, seeing it as a threat to its influence\u2014especially since Tunisian voices aligned with President Saied are calling for new alliances with Beijing and Moscow as an alternative to the United States.<\/p>\n
Any Tunisian move closer to Russia or China would mean distancing\u2014and potentially sidelining\u2014the United States. This, the text argues, is precisely what explains the core of Washington\u2019s interest in Tunisia, viewed as a geographically important pivot point in the U.S. approach to North Africa.<\/p>\n
The U.S. pivot toward Tunisia thus carries two opposite tracks: on the one hand, pressure through demands and the threat of sanctions; on the other, placing Tunisia within the circle of active U.S. attention. The tension is clear, but it does not necessarily imply a complete rupture.<\/p>\n
U.S. interest in Tunisia cannot be reduced to domestic issues and a return to democracy alone. That factor is present, but it is directly connected to U.S. influence within Tunisia\u2019s decision-making circles. The key drivers, however, are broader: Tunisia\u2019s geopolitics, its relations with neighboring countries\u2014especially Algeria and Libya\u2014and its ties with Russia and China and the expansion of their influence.<\/p>\n
The text also does not rule out that one of Washington\u2019s objectives could be to pull Tunisia\u2014through intimidation or incentives\u2014into the path of normalization.<\/p>\n
Find more news and analyses on Africa<\/span> on the Africa Press<\/span> website<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Thabet Al-Amour Africa-Press. Tunisian\u2013American relations have recently seen noticeable diplomatic activity and frequent shuttle visits. This was reflected in repeated trips to Tunisia by the U.S. president\u2019s adviser for Arab and African affairs, Massad Boulos, who visited the country twice within six months. What lies behind this growing U.S. interest in Tunisia\u2014and is it a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":84,"featured_media":4679,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[84],"tags":[120],"class_list":{"0":"post-4681","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-articles","8":"tag-africa"},"yoast_head":"\n
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