Mustafa Al-Saigh, a writer specializing in African affairs<\/b><\/p>\n
Africa-Press. <\/strong> <\/span>With the outbreak of the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran, tensions have returned to overshadow one of the most sensitive regions in the world regarding energy and international trade. The repercussions of military escalation have not been limited to the direct confrontation between the warring parties, but have extended through markets, maritime routes, and trade networks, affecting economies far from the theater of conflict. However, as is often the case, the consequences of these crises are not distributed equally among the countries of the world.<\/p>\n While major economies possess financial tools and reserve capacities that help them absorb shocks, even partially, the picture is different in many developing countries. In Africa in particular, where many economies depend on energy imports and essential goods, and are closely linked to economic relations with Gulf countries, geopolitical tensions in this region quickly turn into a source of economic disruptions.<\/p>\n “Wars that break out in the Middle East find their way to countries and communities far from the conflict zones.”<\/p>\n Here lies a striking paradox in the global economy: wars that erupt in conflict centers can find their way to communities far removed from the conflict. As the risks facing energy and trade markets escalate, a broader question arises about how the effects of these crises reach the most vulnerable economies, and why Africa often seems to be the first to pay the price for conflicts it did not help create.<\/p>\n What began in Hormuz does not stay in Hormuz<\/b><\/p>\n Not all maritime corridors are equal in importance to the global economy. There are a few chokepoints whose disruption can shake international markets within days, with the Strait of Hormuz at the forefront. The narrow maritime corridor between the Iranian and Omani coasts is the main artery through which energy exports flow from the Gulf to the rest of the world, with about 20 million barrels of oil passing through it daily, accounting for nearly one-fifth of global oil trade, in addition to about 22% of global liquefied natural gas trade.<\/p>\n However, the importance of these corridors extends beyond energy; it also encompasses global trade itself. In the Strait of Hormuz, between 2-3% of global container traffic passes through. As security tensions rise, maritime transport is not the only sector affected; the repercussions extend to global air freight networks. Estimates indicate that airlines in the Middle East collectively account for about 13% of global air cargo capacity, making the region a central hub in a trade network increasingly reliant on the rapid transport of high-value goods.<\/p>\n The Strait of Hormuz is also a valve regulating the rhythm of global food security and a strategic hub for stabilizing agricultural supplies, as nearly one-third of the world’s urea exports\u2014one of the most widely used fertilizers\u2014pass through it, while nearly half of global food production depends on fertilizers. Additionally, about 30% of global ammonia production and 50% of urea production are linked to supply chains that pass through this region, reflecting the extent to which these maritime corridors are connected to the stability of the global food system.<\/p>\n Thus, the spike in oil prices was not the only shock; it was accompanied by an unprecedented shipping and insurance crisis, forcing ships to change their routes to the Cape of Good Hope, raising the cost of a single trip by about $4 million, and prompting global insurance companies to reduce their coverage of war risks, leaving supply chains vulnerable. Food security did not escape these shocks, as prices for fertilizers and agricultural inputs rose by rates reaching 35%, making the “loaf of bread” dependent on fuel and sulfur prices from the conflict-ridden region.<\/p>\n Estimates suggest that every sustained increase of $10 in oil prices reduces global growth by about 10-20 basis points over 12 months and drives inflation to record jumps. However, the bitter truth remains that these shocks do not affect everyone equally; while major countries absorb the crisis, fluctuations in energy and trade in developing and poor countries turn into “living explosions” and accumulated debts, revealing a structural fragility that makes Africa and the Global South bear the largest share of the costs of conflicts occurring thousands of miles away from their lands.<\/p>\n Africa at the Eye of the Storm<\/b><\/p>\n The African continent appears to be living in “houses of glass,” where economic fragility amplifies crises. This is not merely bad luck but a natural outcome of a pattern of “economic dependency,” as most African countries are linked to larger centers and powers. When energy corridors shake or wars ignite, African nations find themselves facing a double exposure: a commercial exposure due to excessive reliance on importing essential goods and exporting raw materials, and a financial exposure that makes local currencies and liquidity hostage to fluctuations in the dollar and capital flight to safe havens.<\/p>\n This intersection of global volatility and structural dependency transforms any transient disturbance in the Middle East or elsewhere into a deep living and social crisis that strikes at the heart of the African continent. In this context, the continent seems to be one of the most vulnerable regions to the reverberations of these shocks, where global fluctuations intersect with deep-rooted economic fragility.<\/p>\n In an economy governed by external shocks, the effects of wars do not reach Africa as distant news but as daily pressures reshaping markets and livelihoods. Since the outbreak of the war, movements in fuel prices reveal an inequitable map of shock transmission within the continent, hitting some economies hard while quietly seeping into others, depending on levels of fragility and exposure. Data clearly show this disparity; countries like Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe recorded extremely high increases in gasoline prices, while others experienced lower rates or no significant increases, reflecting that the shock is not evenly distributed among nations.<\/p>\n The transmission of the shock is not limited to price movements alone but is linked to a deeper economic structure that reflects the nature of exposure in the continent. Despite possessing significant oil resources in countries like Nigeria and Angola, Africa spends over $120 billion annually on importing refined petroleum products. It exports about 70% of its crude oil and 45% of its natural gas due to limited refining capacities, costing it estimated losses of around $15 billion annually from exporting crude without local processing.<\/p>\n Under this structure, the shock reflects not just a rise in prices but reveals a deep-rooted pattern of “dependency,” where weak investment in refineries, alongside the dominance of foreign companies, keeps African economies hostage to fuel imports and more vulnerable to external shocks.<\/p>\n Moreover, Africa relies on maritime transport for about 90% of its trade, thus finding itself facing disrupted corridors and rising costs. With navigation in the Strait of Hormuz disrupted and shipping and insurance costs soaring, the cost of goods has doubled before reaching their destinations, turning the external shock into a direct living burden measured in food and essential goods prices.<\/p>\n Furthermore, in a continent where agriculture is a fundamental pillar of livelihoods, rising fertilizer prices have become a direct threat to food production. Previous conflicts – notably the Russian-Ukrainian war – revealed that grain production dropped by about 16% in East Africa, pushing an additional 6-7 million people into food insecurity. Given that households in Africa spend 70% of their income on food, inflation becomes a mechanism for crushing real income. A 10% increase in costs does not merely mean additional expenses but effectively pushes millions of families from subsistence to hunger.<\/p>\n While the African continent was cautiously hoping for a relief in inflation rates at the beginning of 2026, the war has exposed African structural fragility, as inflation has dashed hopes for stability. This was embodied in the warning from the head of the International Monetary Fund that every 10% increase in oil prices will immediately translate into a 40 basis point jump in global inflation. This is the economics of shock at its most extreme, where international figures turn into local earthquakes that swallow dreams of stability.<\/p>\n The shock spreads within African economies like a rapidly spreading contagion, resulting in a sharp hemorrhage in the trade balance, which is burdened by an import bill of $719 billion. Faced with this crushing demand for foreign currency, the continent’s monetary defenses are collapsing, as the African Development Bank has reported a decline in the value of currencies in 29 African countries following the outbreak of the war.<\/p>\n The past decade for Africa has not been merely a series of crises but a harsh test of the resilience of its financial structure under the weight of successive shocks, from the COVID-19 pandemic to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Although countries like Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya have adopted tight monetary policies and raised interest rates in an attempt to bolster stability, this approach has not been sufficient to contain the repercussions of the current shock.<\/p>\n Investor appetite quickly diminished, and short-term capital flows began to exit toward what are known as safe havens, primarily the dollar, which has surged amid the war, leaving African markets in turmoil. This casts a heavy shadow over Africa’s debt burden, which had already reached $1.9 trillion by 2024, equivalent to two-thirds of the continent’s gross domestic product.<\/p>\n Economic Fragility in Africa<\/b><\/p>\n The depth of the impact that external shocks have on African economies cannot be understood without considering the deeper structure that governs the continent’s position within the global economic system. The fragility revealed by the war, along with subsequent disruptions in energy, transportation, and financing prices, is not merely a circumstantial result but reflects a pattern of economic dependency that ties these economies to external sources for securing their basic needs and determining their developmental paths.<\/p>\n In this pattern, the shock does not reach Africa as an isolated event; rather, it transforms into a recurring mechanism that reproduces crises, where global disruptions intersect with an economy reliant on imports, redirecting its resources towards exporting raw materials, and depending on unstable capital flows for financing. Thus, dependency manifests in three main forms: increasing reliance on importing essential goods, exporting primary commodities, and financial exposure to external funding sources, particularly short-term capital.<\/p>\n The structure of African trade clearly illustrates what Egyptian economist Samir Amin pointed out regarding the nature of “structural dependency” that governs the relationship between the periphery and the center in the global economic system. African trade does not merely reflect quantitative imbalances in the trade balance but reveals an inequitable pattern of integration into the global economy, based on exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. Raw commodities dominate nearly 70% of exports outside the continent, while manufactured goods account for about 60% of imports. This exposure increases due to the concentration of trading partners, with the European Union still being the largest partner, accounting for about 43% of exports and 34.5% of imports.<\/p>\n Thus, it seems that the model proposed by British economist David Ricardo regarding “comparative advantage” has not led African economies to efficiency, but rather entrenched a pattern based on specialization in exporting raw commodities, which reproduces the structural trap of exports and deepens dependency. This is evident in the concentration of exports from countries like Mali, Ghana, and Sudan in gold, with significant reliance on specific markets such as the UAE, making these exports more vulnerable to market disruptions linked to geopolitical conflicts.<\/p>\n In the energy sector, countries like Nigeria and Angola export about 70% of their crude oil and 45% of their natural gas without refining, costing them approximately $15 billion annually due to the lack of added value. Additionally, Kenyan agricultural exports have incurred losses estimated at around $2 million weekly since the outbreak of the war. This pattern does not stop at commodity trade but extends to food security itself, with estimates indicating that about 80% of essential food items in Africa are imported, deepening the continent’s reliance on global markets to secure its basic needs.<\/p>\n A report on trade and economic prospects in Africa for 2026 issued by a local source indicated that African trade routes are not determined in isolation from external factors but are significantly influenced by global market price cycles over which the continent has no control. Oil, mineral, and agricultural product prices are not set within African economies but are imposed on them by international markets, while African economic variables such as inflation, growth, or fiscal balance contribute only marginally to shaping them. However, the impact of these prices does not stop at the global market; it penetrates deeply into Africa, as shocks transmit through macroeconomic channels, reflecting on exchange rates, public revenues, debt levels, growth rates, and inflation.<\/p>\n The Financing Dependency Dilemma<\/b><\/p>\n If trade dependency means that African markets are tied to exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods, then the financial version of “dependency” is the most dangerous; it signifies the continent’s reliance on external capital flows, debt denominated in hard currencies, and international aid to finance its budgets and development projects. This pattern of “dependency” deprives African countries of the financial space necessary to respond to crises.<\/p>\n The dangers of geopolitical tensions are primarily responsible for deepening the financing gap in Africa. While international powers are preoccupied with conflicts, the continent finds itself facing a dire financial reality; data indicates that the share of foreign direct investment directed to Africa plummeted to half in 2022 under the weight of the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, and this hemorrhage continued to reach 42% in the first half of 2025. This capital flight is not just a number; it is a declaration of lost global confidence in the stability of emerging markets at every political tremor.<\/p>\n Contrary to what international institutions promote that borrowing is a means of growth, public debt in Africa reached a historic peak of 63.5% of GDP in 2024, with payments on foreign debt denominated in foreign currencies consuming more than 31% of government revenues (a record percentage according to Standard & Poor’s ratings). This means that one-third of the efforts of African peoples goes to debt repayment instead of investing in health and education, placing foreign currency reserves under immense pressure and making refinancing risks a nightmare for African decision-makers.<\/p>\n North Africa emerges as the most affected region bearing the burdens of this debt in 2026, with Egypt alone accounting for about one-third of the amounts due, which explains governments’ recourse to local and foreign borrowing to cover the increasing budget deficits resulting from the burdens of subsidies and debt servicing. This fragility makes the continent financially exposed. According to a local source, 13 African countries are among the top 20 globally distressed countries, which is not a geographical fate but a direct result of a financial structure that ties the continent’s fate to market fluctuations and distant conflicts, making the recovery of monetary and financial sovereignty an existential necessity, not a metaphor.<\/p>\n As foreign investments dwindle and debt burdens escalate that shackled the financial sovereignty of countries, the African economy has found no escape but to rely on expatriates. Here, remittances are no longer just support for families; they have become the only lifeline for the continent, revealing a new face of structural vulnerability. In 2023, these remittances reached about $100 billion, representing approximately 52% of total external financing sources, surpassing both foreign direct investments ($48 billion) and official development assistance ($42 billion).<\/p>\n These flows play a pivotal role in supporting economic stability by enhancing foreign currency reserves and contributing to the stability of local currencies, as well as being a lifeline for more than 200 million Africans, who directly rely on them to meet their living needs, as is the case in Kenya, where about 65% of the population depends on these remittances.<\/p>\n However, this reliance, despite its importance, carries structural risks, as these flows remain hostage to the economic conditions in host countries. In this context, Gulf countries represent the most important sources of remittances to Africa, given that millions of Africans work there. Yet any disruption due to economic slowdown or conflicts leads to a decline in these flows, imposing severe financial pressures on the economies that depend on them, especially in North Africa.<\/p>\n The convergence of these three dimensions of trade structure imbalance, dependency on foreign financing and debts, culminating in a critical reliance on remittances from expatriates, paints a complete picture of complex economic dependency. This fragile structure makes the African continent exposed to any geopolitical storm abroad; a distant tension in the Middle East immediately reverberates deep within the continent in the form of liquidity drought, rising living costs, and unbearable pressure on local currencies.<\/p>\n A Bitter Medicine<\/b><\/p>\n Ultimately, African economies find themselves forced to swallow the bitter medicine dictated by international institutions, a remedy that has historically failed to eradicate the disease, instead reproducing its causes in more complex forms. The insistence on “neoliberal” policies in response to external shocks not only reveals the depth of vulnerability but also reinforces it, as governments resort to borrowing to fill revenue gaps, only to find themselves trapped in the austerity conditions once again.<\/p>\n The vicious cycle begins with austerity measures that include cutting subsidies and raising interest rates in an attempt to contain inflation and restore financial stability. However, these policies come at a high cost, leading to increased burdens of external debt service and eroding fiscal space, pushing countries toward the International Monetary Fund for rescue, in a path that deepens reliance on external sources rather than breaking it.<\/p>\n What exacerbates this harsh reality is that estimates indicate that for every dollar African countries borrow, about 70 cents flows back out in the form of capital flight, reflecting a continuous drain of resources. In this situation, policymakers, under pressure from financial commitments, are forced to cut social welfare programs at the very moment when the African citizen faces the highest levels of living pressure.<\/p>\n Thus, African governments, compelled by circumstances, shift the costs of economic shocks onto their citizens, where families bear the full brunt, while the continent remains trapped in an economically controlled structure from the outside, reproducing dependency at the expense of its sovereignty and the well-being of its people, which means deepening and perpetuating crises without end.<\/p>\n