Abbas Mohamed Saleh, a researcher interested in political and intellectual issues and regional policies<\/b><\/p>\n
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Africa-Press. <\/strong> <\/span>The international Berlin Conference for Sudan, held on April 15, and the preceding preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa (from April 10 to 12), sparked widespread debate. Although the stated goal of the conference was to unify Sudanese people, in reality, it widened the gap between the concerned parties, whose positions were supposed to unify in preparation for an inclusive Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue.<\/p>\n The truth is that the conference, as will be shown, sought to achieve hidden objectives that serve the interests of external parties more than they serve the Sudanese themselves, regardless of the positions of these Sudanese\u2014whether they were for or against the conference, or agreed or disagreed with its issues and outcomes.<\/p>\n In light of the disagreements and divisions caused by the call for this conference, particularly regarding participation, its results led to further polarization, division, and fragmentation, rather than unifying positions and achieving consensus.<\/p>\n Consequently, external intervention will remain a complex factor in resolving the conflict in Sudan, and may even contribute to its exacerbation.<\/p>\n Based on this, the delay in issuing the final outcomes of the conference\u2014and the mere announcement of the “Berlin Principles for Sudan” on April 30, rather than a mutually agreed final statement among participants, nearly two weeks after its convening\u2014reflects the extent of disagreements and the absence of consensus among its parties, as well as conflicting agendas of external powers, especially between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. This indicates that the “Five-Power Group”\u2014as an attempt to end the conflict of external initiatives\u2014will continue, after the Berlin Conference, along the same path of stagnation that characterized the experience of the “Quartet,” as the efforts did not lead to unifying the Sudanese position, but rather revealed the division among external actors regarding approaches to resolving the conflict.<\/p>\n Beyond the Conference: Objectives, Organization, and Participants<\/b><\/p>\n The Berlin Conference was organized jointly by the African Union, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to circulating documents, the goal is to reach an expanded “Principles Declaration” that focuses on representing civilians from “both sides”\u2014that is, supporters of the armed forces and supporters of the rebellion alike\u2014as well as “promoting dialogue among various civilian factions.”<\/p>\n This conference followed the Paris (2024) and London (2025) conferences, which primarily focused on general humanitarian issues. The Berlin Conference came as the fourth anniversary of the war in Sudan approached, amid ongoing failures to end it.<\/p>\n Amid the conflicting and fluctuating positions among the parties involved in participation, between 40 to 50 Sudanese participants were invited, who were supposed to be evenly divided between political representatives and representatives from civil society and professionals. However, the issue of “fairness in the distribution of invitations” quickly arose, as the distribution was deemed unfair and non-transparent.<\/p>\n What distinguishes the Berlin Conference from previous initiatives and mediations is that it focused this time on both political and military issues, with the essential participation of “civilians.” The goal is to design the future of the “political process and de-escalation measures,” in addition to discussing the “formation of a fully empowered democratic civilian government,” which would serve as a basis for any upcoming political process.<\/p>\n In other words, the organizers’ goal behind this conference and the preparatory meeting, as well as previous movements, was to unify civil political groups and formulate a vision for a political path that provides a minimum of consensus among participants. This would enable these parties to participate in a comprehensive national dialogue, after excluding the “warring parties”\u2014specifically the internationally recognized government and the Islamists, of course.<\/p>\n This leads to an important observation: External conferences\u2014such as the Berlin Conference\u2014under the influence and interests of external powers, have turned into mere tools for imposing solutions on the Sudanese people. They thus fuel conflict, division, and competition, rather than being a facilitating factor for dialogue to reach final and lasting solutions and settlements.<\/p>\n As a result, we find political parties racing to participate in these conferences, even if such participation comes at the expense of their internal cohesion, or the goals and political programs that once united them as blocs and alliances. Furthermore, these external interventions weaken the chances of reaching a consensus on major national issues, complicating the task of the “Five-Power Group” itself, which will find it difficult to build on what it has accumulated from communication and dialogues with civil forces and parties, in preparation for a comprehensive political dialogue “owned by the Sudanese.”<\/p>\n In this conference, the Sudanese government and armed forces, as well as the Rapid Support Forces and their parallel government, were excluded on the grounds that they are “parties to the war.” However, it is notable that in the planning to ensure a guaranteed majority for a specific political bloc, 10 invitations were allocated to the “Solidarity” group led by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, 10 to emergency rooms, and other invitations to resistance committees, in addition to other representatives close to this group or deemed likely to play the same role in the conference and beyond, which has caused divisions even among these groups.<\/p>\n To achieve this goal, a preparatory meeting was held prior to the Berlin conference from April 10 to 12, which included a workshop aimed at defining the “Solidarity” bloc and its allies as a basic foundation, ensuring that participants in the meeting focused on a carefully selected agenda, in order to demonstrate some forms of “inclusivity” in the face of reactions rejecting the conference and boycotting important political forces.<\/p>\n The holding of the preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa, after ensuring the participation of some political groups to facilitate the Berlin conference, effectively entrenched a dangerous method of systematic exclusion. Some participants were denied travel to attend the conference for flimsy reasons, and the participation quotas of selected and preferred parties were controlled, serving the interests of those with personal and narrow agendas at the expense of genuine public interests.<\/p>\n Overall, in light of some parties betting on achieving the statement of the “Quadruple Group” issued on September 12, 2025, and the group’s stagnation due to Saudi-Emirati disagreements and the recent American-Israeli war, and the armed forces’ firm stance and refusal to yield to pressure, the Berlin conference aims to rally international support to achieve the following objectives:<\/p>\n 1. Making the conference outcomes a basis for international and regional efforts regarding the conflict in Sudan, by integrating the work approach and objectives of the “Quadruple Group” within the “Quintet Group,” which has become an internationally accepted framework.<\/p>\n 2. Circumventing the national solution proposed by the Sudanese government (roadmap) which was approved and supported by the majority of “Quintet” members, but contradicts the interests of external parties.<\/p>\n 3. Rallying international support for a pre-determined “civilian” majority, by making the “Solidarity” group the preferred political team for international circles in any settlement that may occur in Sudan.<\/p>\n 4. Undermining the legitimacy of the current government and weakening it, paving the way for new constitutional political arrangements in the country, which may lead to a new transitional government “led by civilians.”<\/p>\n 5. Supporting the Emirati agenda and washing its image, as the UAE is the main sponsor of the rebellion and the allied civilian groups, rather than being presented as a neutral party within the “Quadruple” or others.<\/p>\n Based on the holding of the Berlin conference, the current trajectory assumes that the international pressures exerted on “the parties to the war” may result in a ceasefire, as outlined in the “Quadruple Group” roadmap on September 12, 2025, which represents a clear Emirati ceiling.<\/p>\n The Dilemma of Uniting Civilians: “Dividing the Divided”<\/p>\n The political scene in Sudan is characterized by the dominance of forces and blocs that raise slogans of democracy and civility, yet do not achieve them in reality nor do they apply to themselves. Since 2019, the political space has been based on seeking external support, enabling this external influence to draw the boundaries and interactions of the internal political scene. Therefore, designing a political process on this basis, starting from the Berlin conference, will only be another wasted opportunity.<\/p>\n What makes the situation worse is the naive assumption adopted by external circles regarding the situation in Sudan, where the conflict is reduced to merely a confrontation between “civilians” yearning for democracy and “non-civilians” (including the military, Islamists, and traditional forces). Based on this assumption, it is believed that international support for efforts to unite “civilians” can yield positive results.<\/p>\n For this reason, significant efforts have been made by external parties involved in Sudanese affairs, primarily focusing on uniting the “voices of civilians” and making them a trusted force for political transition during and after the war, and resuming the democratic path. Thus, it was necessary to unify them into a single bloc or coalition.<\/p>\n One example of this is the efforts made by German diplomat Annett Weber, as the special representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa, who engaged early in efforts to unite civilians. However, divisions have plagued the “Solidarity” group itself, which has split into several factions based on gaining “external legitimacy” against “internal legitimacy.”<\/p>\n More specifically, the distribution of invitations to external conferences based on blocs and banners was done selectively to represent specific groups more prominently, while reducing the representation of others. This division – into political groups, civil society, national or independent figures, resistance committees, emergency rooms, in addition to women’s and youth categories – aims to achieve Emirati political goals, after failing to achieve them through war.<\/p>\n Moreover, external interventions have caused significant divisions among Sudanese political parties, reflecting external biases at the same time. Even external actors have come to agree on imposing a division of Sudanese political forces and blocs into two main teams:<\/p>\n The first team: the “Solidarity” group, supported by the UAE, complementing the project of the “Foundation Group” allied with the Rapid Support Forces. This group itself is experiencing conflicts among its different currents.<\/p>\n The second team: the “National Forces” group or the “Democratic Bloc” supporting the armed forces, including civil political movements. This group is also very fragmented and weak, divided among itself.<\/p>\n However, even this division does not meet the requirements for establishing solid political blocs based on a minimum consensus, which could pave the way for an inclusive civil dialogue. This division ignores the reality that within these alliances and blocs are conflicts and competitions that lead to a constant state of fragmentation, which may result in further divisions in light of the outcomes of the Berlin conference. Additionally, the majority of components of these competing and conflicting alliances lack democracy within themselves and within the alliances they join.<\/p>\n Political Deception: The Game of Legitimacy and Its Withdrawal<\/b><\/p>\n Actors in the international community\u2014perhaps intentionally, as in the case of the “Quintet”\u2014engage in forms of deception when mapping power dynamics and coalitions in the Sudanese arena, bestowing political legitimacy on some while stripping it from other undesirable competitors. They do not operate from an objective definition of the line between “violence,” “civilian,” “peaceful,” and “democratic,” which is dictated by the sensitivity of the complex political context in Sudan, especially following the outbreak of the current war. Instead, they rely on narrow rhetorical or subjective descriptions, or on characterizations imposed by external parties.<\/p>\n The prevailing classification adopted by these external circles, which relies solely on the stance regarding the April war as a criterion, is a flawed, dangerous, and misleading approach. These parties avoid accurately describing what has transpired in the country since 2023: it is an outright rebellion and external aggression, not merely a difference of opinions among powers or conflicts between political factions.<\/p>\n Within this classification, external parties present groups like “Solidarity” as a neutral civilian entity, despite strong indications of its involvement in supporting the war effort through media and political spaces (statements, positions, declarations). In doing so, it fulfills a preordained function: political support for the parties involved in igniting the war, primarily Abu Dhabi.<\/p>\n In reality, classifying positions in the Sudanese arena into “war supporters” and “war opponents” is deliberate misinformation. The “anti-war” groups are actually biased toward a warring party and serve the agenda of the largest war supporter: the United Arab Emirates. Conversely, other parties, including the armed forces, are weakened and marginalized, treated as a political faction rather than a constitutional institution concerned with protecting the country’s unity and sovereignty, especially in cases of rebellion and serious conflict.<\/p>\n Despite the equality between the constitutional legitimacy of the armed forces and the internationally recognized de facto government (even by Germany itself), the exclusion of the “Foundation” group was not because it represents one of the “sides of the war”\u2014despite its civilian identity, it is merely groups that emerged from the “Progress” umbrella (currently “Solidarity”)\u2014but because Abu Dhabi is betting on the “Solidarity” group rather than on “Foundation.” Strengthening the influence of “Solidarity” and presenting it as a neutral civilian group, to make it a key force in leading the political transition again, serves Abu Dhabi’s agendas, which can sacrifice “Foundation” and the Rapid Support Forces (after their images have been tarnished both domestically and internationally), but only on the condition of ensuring a strong presence of “Solidarity.”<\/p>\n Thus, the organizers of the Berlin conference sought to give “Solidarity” a larger share of participants, effectively making it the majority at the conference. If the true political positions of the participants were sorted, we would find that supporters of the “Solidarity” and “Foundation” groups received significant representation, aimed at enabling them to return to lead the “political transition” again should the war end according to the current arrangements. This proves that they are part of a single project sponsored by external powers to achieve their interests in Sudan.<\/p>\n In this context, the conference was preceded by a workshop in Addis Ababa, exclusively dedicated to pre-targeted civil groups, aimed at enhancing their presence in Berlin and in upcoming events of the “Quintet,” leading to a comprehensive “Sudanese-Sudanese” dialogue “owned by the Sudanese.” However, this time, the Berlin conference has a clear political goal: to strip legitimacy from active parties such as the armed forces and the existing government, and to grant it to other parties.<\/p>\n As planned, the Berlin meeting will form the basis for future Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue and will determine who will participate. However, its outcomes were meaningless, given the widespread boycott and insistence on engineering a pre-prepared political process in terms of participants, agenda, and expected results.<\/p>\n Germany and Its Foreign Policies: Focus on Elites<\/b><\/p>\n To understand the motivations behind the convening of the international Berlin conference regarding Sudan and the emphasis on involving specific political orientations, it is essential to examine Germany’s foreign policy. This policy is based on promoting secular and democratic trends, supporting countries undergoing transformations or preliminary steps toward these goals, with a focus on liberal trends, civil society, and activists. In the case of Sudan, there is a greater temptation, as it combines conditions of conflict and its aftermath, political transition, and finally the dilemma of excluding Islamists as a popular movement and a former ruling system.<\/p>\n Germany has a history of investing in political elites, especially in the developing world. In Sudan, there are many segments of elites with secular and liberal orientations associated with this. Therefore, post-2019 Sudan represents an ideal field for applying aspects of its foreign policies.<\/p>\n There is also a phenomenon of “excessive admiration” for youth and women’s engagement in political activism. German circles and organizations view the participation of these groups in protests as a political phenomenon worthy of support, which may help achieve a democratic transition.<\/p>\n Thus, prominent German institutions such as “Berghof,” “Friedrich Ebert,” “Heinrich Bo\u0308ll,” “Konrad Adenauer,” and the “Max Planck Institute for International Peace and the Rule of Law,” alongside other international organizations, are actively supporting various programs and activities in Sudan or related to its current issues. These interests fall within the framework of German foreign policy agendas.<\/p>\n In this context, Volker Perthes, the special representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan and former head of “UNITAMS,” continues to shape and direct German movements toward Sudan, including the current Berlin conference, and reinforces foreign orientations due to his awareness of the situation. The German Foreign Ministry also plays a significant role in shaping the agenda of non-German organizations active in Sudan through international partnerships and funding organizations involved in mediation, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution, specifically building the capacities of civil and youth groups or conducting dialogues with specific political groups.<\/p>\n In parallel, the French organization “Promediation,” specialized in facilitating dialogue among different political groups, has become one of the most engaged Western organizations in Sudanese affairs. Recently, this organization led attempts to dialogue with Islamist groups, which are internationally viewed as “potential spoilers” to any political process and a factor in obstructing the end of the war through negotiation. The goal of this dialogue is to soften the positions of Islamists, dividing them into “hawks” and “doves,” thereby weakening them as an active mass with an influential popular base.<\/p>\n Consequently, “Promediation” undertakes this task on behalf of Western countries, which are pursuing parallel paths to isolate Islamists and delegitimize them, preventing any return to the political arena, and rejecting their participation in any direct or formal dialogues.<\/p>\n In addition to dialogue with Islamists, “Promediation” has recently also engaged in dialogues and workshops with civil groups, whether in favor of or against “the warring parties.” This helps in mapping power dynamics before granting legitimacy and representation in meetings such as the recent Berlin conference. However, this engagement has failed to outline a map of genuine actors with political weight that can be relied upon, whether in national dialogue or in arrangements to end the conflict led by the “Quad.”<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/b><\/p>\n As previously mentioned, while ignoring the dangerous and destructive role of the UAE in fueling the conflict in Sudan, and insisting on serving its agendas through various international mechanisms, the Berlin conference was another episode of international failure regarding the situation in Sudan and not a pathway to resolution.<\/p>\n The passing of the outcomes of this conference involves pre-prepared political introductions, identifying specific parties, exploiting conflicts and competition among political factions, and creating sharper divisions among all, which will have severe repercussions and consequences. In fact, the conflict in the coming stages may turn into a confrontation between two camps: the external camp and its allies from certain political forces, and the internal camp.<\/p>\n Moreover, the attempt to engineer a political settlement to serve external agendas, dragging some conflicting political forces and individuals with narrow personal interests to legitimize this path, and betting on external movements to impose it\u2014while ignoring the Sudanese government\u2014is a completely unrealistic approach, and it is not expected to succeed at this time.<\/p>\n In conclusion, despite the principle of respecting the sovereignty of states and not infringing upon it, the Berlin conference has, in fact, established a dangerous precedent in African politics, as it conspires to violate the sovereignty of a state and delegitimize its internationally recognized government, in favor of a clear external project that sought to impose its agendas through the barrel of rebellion, and when it failed, it now attempts to pass them through international and regional mechanisms such as the “Quad” group currently.<\/p>\n