Africa-Press. <\/strong> <\/span>Moussa Boulous, senior advisor to Trump on Middle Eastern and African affairs, continues his diligent efforts to reach a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan. However, so far, he has not succeeded in achieving this goal, despite repeated pressures and attempts to persuade the Sudanese leadership to accept the current American proposal and abandon its conditions and reservations that could undermine the initiative’s core essence.<\/p>\nIn reality, the American ceasefire will not materialize in this manner, and other parties, including the Rapid Support Forces militia and its Emirati backers, will not accept the conditions presented by the government and the military leadership. Consequently, failure will continue to accompany the diplomatic approach followed by Boulous, despite his own later acknowledgment that discussions about reaching an agreement are still premature. Nevertheless, he continues his efforts in an attempt to achieve a milestone that may be his only accomplishment during his tenure in this position and his involvement in hot issues on the African continent, specifically.<\/p>\n
Terms of the American Initiative<\/b><\/p>\n
Based on leaked information so far, the initiative proposed by Moussa Boulous calls for the armed forces and the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces militia to reach a 90-day ceasefire, considering it a central point and a basis for resolving the conflict. The initiative includes five main issues: humanitarian ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, access to aid and protection of civilians, permanent ceasefire and security arrangements, political process, and revival and reconstruction.<\/p>\n
It is clear, according to Boulous’s approach, that the primary goal of this ceasefire is to alleviate international pressures on Abu Dhabi. Despite the complicity and silence of the international community regarding the UAE’s involvement in the Sudanese conflict, documented reports about its support for the Rapid Support Forces are increasing in an undeniable manner, making it responsible for the escalating humanitarian crisis resulting from the deliberate targeting of civilian facilities and properties in cities from which the rebels have been expelled, and using policies aimed at forcibly displacing populations.<\/p>\n
Additionally, the proposed ceasefire urgently aims to legitimize the statement of the Quartet\u2014the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE\u2014issued on September 12, 2025, which included a roadmap representing a clear Emirati ceiling regarding Sudan. Thus, the current proposal seeks to link the military and political tracks, so that the ceasefire leads to political arrangements that achieve for Abu Dhabi the same goals it seeks through its support and bet on the rebellion and its political counterpart in Sudan.<\/p>\n
The American initiative proposes a settlement among political elites based on power-sharing, thus reproducing the failures of the post-2019 phase. Furthermore, the ceasefire aims to provide the rebels with the opportunity to catch their breath and prepare for further rounds of fighting, which will undoubtedly be more intense, especially since the military pressures exerted by the armed forces have led to the depletion of the rebellion’s capabilities, which may lead to its collapse at some point, despite the enormous external support it receives.<\/p>\n
American Failure in Hot Files<\/b><\/p>\n
In general, the diplomatic approach that Boulous is currently engaged in is inseparable from the foreign policy of the Trump administration, derived from the principle of “America First.” This approach seeks to achieve immediate economic and commercial interests for the United States, without providing just and final solutions to existing problems, and perhaps even imposing settlements from abroad at the expense of the interests of the peoples in these countries.<\/p>\n
In this approach, the Americans abandon the role of an impartial mediator, becoming a biased party towards certain sides, exerting pressure on specific parties to engage, under the weight of pressure and blackmail, in the paths they define, seeking urgent results that serve political agendas or geopolitical interests of certain regional parties. In this context, American administration agencies continuously exert pressure through successive sanctions, aiming to push targeted parties to yield or change their positions.<\/p>\n
In this regard, Boulous previously proposed an initiative regarding Libya, based on power-sharing and unifying institutions between the east and west of the country. However, it was met with widespread rejection, despite indications of preliminary acceptance from political factions in both the internationally recognized Tripoli government and the eastern government backed by Khalifa Haftar’s team.<\/p>\n
The Libyan initiative resembles the Sudanese initiative in the expected outcomes: entrenching minority political rule, that is, some form of familial rule between the Al-Dabaiba and Haftar families in Libya, or imposing specific civil groups, as in Sudan, with a complete disregard for any reference to democratic governance that reflects the will of the peoples and places the two countries on the path to a permanent and stable settlement. Thus, both initiatives faced significant rejection in both countries.<\/p>\n
In the context of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Trump administration leaned towards reapplying the same mechanisms used in Sudan: imposing sanctions on certain parties to pressure them and imposing prior solutions that consider the interests of other parties. In this framework, dual pressures are exerted against Kigali and the March 23 Movement, in favor of the Congolese government led by Felix Tshisekedi, which engaged with the Trump administration in enticing economic contracts.<\/p>\n
As for Ethiopia, the American administration announced sanctions against leaders from the Tigray region and their families, imposing restrictions on their ability to obtain visas to enter the United States. This is despite the fact that the United States is considered a mediator with influence over the parties, and despite being the largest guarantor of the Pretoria Agreement, signed on November 2, 2022, between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.<\/p>\n
Conversely, Washington, which has engaged in communication with the Eritrean regime to achieve geopolitical interests in the Red Sea, has avoided imposing sanctions on Eritrea, despite its clear role in destabilizing the situation in northern Ethiopia and its continued support for the rebels there.<\/p>\n
The Sudanese Government’s Response to the Initiative<\/b><\/p>\n
The Sudanese government’s response to the American initiative came in a document titled “Restoring Peace in Sudan,” dated June 25, 2026, which included conditions and restrictions aimed at refuting the terms of the initiative.<\/p>\n
While the government document emphasizes the necessity of the complete withdrawal of the rebel militia from all cities it occupied after April 2023, according to a timeline covering the proposed ceasefire period, the American initiative refers to “limited withdrawal,” which means freezing the lines of conflict throughout the ceasefire period.<\/p>\n
Both parties may agree that multiple international mechanisms, including the United States, the United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League, should oversee the withdrawal operations, despite fundamental disagreements regarding this specific point.<\/p>\n
The government document, based on the outcomes of the Jeddah Declaration issued on May 11, 2023, stresses that the flow of aid must occur “with the government’s approval.” In contrast, the American initiative seeks to legitimize the parallel entity that the “Establishment” alliance aims to establish, including control over humanitarian work, or perhaps allowing international entities, such as the United Nations, to deliver aid. Regarding this point, local circles have concerns that humanitarian work may be used as a cover to pass logistical support to the rebels or to legitimize their control over areas and populations.<\/p>\n
While the government document restricts the formation of a civilian government to being “elected,” subject to the armed forces, the American initiative ambiguously refers to a “civilian government,” which is understood as a reference to the civil groups loyal to the UAE.<\/p>\n
The government document also emphasizes the necessity of “protecting Sudan’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity by ending foreign military intervention and support for the rebel militia and foreign fighters and the flow of illegal weapons.”<\/p>\n
The Political Dialogue Process<\/b><\/p>\n
The fundamental disagreements between the American initiative and the government’s response extend beyond the issue of the ceasefire duration and security and military arrangements; they also encompass the political aspect, where there is a fundamental difference. The American proposal seeks to build on the Quartet’s statement\u2014the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE\u2014and the outcomes of the Berlin meetings on April 15, 2026, Nairobi in May 2026, Addis Ababa in June 2026, and others, where external parties, such as the Quintet, composed of the United Nations, the United States, the African Union, and IGAD, facilitate the Sudanese-Sudanese political dialogue process.<\/p>\n
In contrast, the Sudanese government’s proposal aims to “launch a comprehensive national dialogue within Sudan led by civilians under the supervision of the United Nations,” which could lead to “the formation of a transitional civilian government and the initiation of a political process to achieve a comprehensive political settlement and a unified Sudan under civilian rule and state institutions led by civilians.”<\/p>\n
In light of the government’s response, the positions are very far apart, to the extent that reaching even a declaration of principles seems difficult, let alone a final agreement. The government’s response also indicates that all external mediations have reached the conclusion that direct negotiations are challenging, thus the indirect dialogue approach will remain the only option in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n
Strategy of Splitting Leadership<\/b><\/p>\n
In the face of the government’s and military leadership’s rigidity, Moussa Boulous resorted to a tactic aimed at weakening their positions by opening communication channels with First Lieutenant Shams al-Din Kabashi, assistant to the chief of the armed forces. The American envoy, who works in harmony with Abu Dhabi’s agenda, aims to create a rift in the Sudanese leadership, classifying it into “hardliners” who reject the settlement and ceasefire, and “moderates” represented by First Lieutenant Kabashi.<\/p>\n
While pressures and sanctions are imposed on the “hardliners” under the pretext of obstructing peace efforts, Kabashi is being groomed to play influential leadership roles that may help in accepting the ceasefire and abandoning the government’s conditions.<\/p>\n
However, Kabashi’s ability to pass the American proposal remains limited, as the rejection of the ceasefire finds support and acceptance from wide sectors of the Sudanese people and the armed forces institution. There is also a widespread belief that any ceasefire will serve the rebellion and its external sponsors. However, if the assumption is that Kabashi’s rise to leadership will support external movements, these tactics may lead to the opposite, that is, a retreat in his role in the current leadership. It is also expected that there will later be a media focus on the narrative of “conflict within the leadership,” aimed at implying that it “rejects efforts to end the war,” while obscuring its reservations and the nature of its position on the terms of the American initiative.<\/p>\n
Settlement Like Libya?<\/b><\/p>\n
In light of Boulous’s initiative, it seems that the proposed settlement for the Sudanese follows the same path as his proposal for a settlement in Libya: imposing a top-down settlement that primarily considers the interests of Abu Dhabi and its agenda.<\/p>\n
This approach to solutions and settlements, accompanied by coordinated media campaigns aimed at deception, confusion, and pressure, ignores the roots of problems and crises, and works to impose external will on peoples and states, making settlements based on power-sharing, and perhaps wealth-sharing, while leaving the external parties controlling and guaranteeing the political future in these two countries.<\/p>\n
Moreover, Moussa Boulous’s initiatives in Libya and Sudan work to legitimize Abu Dhabi’s allies and parallel entities. Therefore, discussing targeting the parties benefiting from the continuation of war involves a significant and blatant contradiction, as it deliberately ignores identifying who the real beneficiaries of this bloody conflict are.<\/p>\n
Find more news and analyses on Africa<\/span> on the Africa Press<\/span> website<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By Abbas Mohamed Saleh, a researcher interested in political and intellectual issues and regional policies Africa-Press. Moussa Boulous, senior advisor to Trump on Middle Eastern and African affairs, continues his diligent efforts to reach a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan. However, so far, he has not succeeded in achieving this goal, despite repeated pressures and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":84,"featured_media":7549,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[84],"tags":[120],"class_list":{"0":"post-7550","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-articles","8":"tag-africa"},"yoast_head":"\n
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