{"id":66803,"date":"2026-02-15T22:03:55","date_gmt":"2026-02-15T22:03:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.africa-press.net\/lesotho\/all-news\/strategic-raw-material-cooperation-between-africa-and-europe"},"modified":"2026-02-15T22:38:16","modified_gmt":"2026-02-15T22:38:16","slug":"strategic-raw-material-cooperation-between-africa-and-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.africa-press.net\/lesotho\/all-news\/strategic-raw-material-cooperation-between-africa-and-europe","title":{"rendered":"Strategic Raw Material Cooperation Between Africa and Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"

Africa-Press – Lesotho. <\/strong> <\/span>African governments are entering the geopolitical competition over critical raw materials with a growing sense of strategic confidence. While the AU-EU Summit in Luanda in November 2025 reaffirmed political commitments on both sides, European initiatives continue to lose ground. It is true that the Critical Raw Materials Act has expanded the EU\u2019s diplomatic footprint; however, its limited project pipeline and fragmented financing under the Global Gateway have left the bloc unable to match the speed and scale of competing offers notably from China, the Gulf States and the US. African partners expect cooperation on industrial projects and deeper integration into value chains. With stronger internal coordination and increased financing under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU can strengthen both its ability to deliver and its credibility.<\/p>\n

African governments are increasingly repositioning themselves amid the growing global demand for minerals and the inten\u00adsifying geopolitical competition. As cur\u00adrent or future producers of copper, cobalt, graphite and other minerals, they are adopting a more assertive approach, more closely aligning their raw material policies with domestic industrial objectives and recalibrating their engagement with inter\u00adnational partners accordingly.<\/p>\n

At the continental level, the African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS), which the African Union (AU) adopted in 2025, seeks to promote local value creation and regional supply-chain integration. Governments from Johannesburg to Dar es Salaam are courting investment not only in mining but also in mineral processing and enabling infrastructure.<\/p>\n

This repositioning is shaped by a broader geoeconomic turn. Global competition over resilient supply chains has evolved into a contest over industrial sovereignty, at the centre of which stand critical raw materials (CRMs). For its part, the European Union (EU) is still searching for a coherent response to this development. Decoupling from non-European supply is neither realistic nor desirable, as Europe\u2019s demand cannot be met domestically. Thus, the bloc\u2019s increased resilience in mineral supply chains depends on diversification based on reliable external partnerships.<\/p>\n

At the AU-EU Summit in Luanda in No\u00advember 2025, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and CRM cooperation. With CRMs now increasingly addressed through industrial and geopolitical lenses, the EU must use the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) to adjust its external instruments \u2013 including the EU budget and the engagement of the Euro\u00adpean Investment Bank (EIB) \u2013 in order to engage effectively with external actors on this issue. The twofold goal should be to promote its own diversification goals and respond to Africa\u2019s increasingly assertive industrial strategies.<\/p>\n

African states\u2019 industrial ambitions and strategic agency<\/p>\n

Many African states remain heavily depend\u00adent on the export of unprocessed raw materials, a model that captures a limited share of value and reinforces the weak upstream and downstream linkages to the wider economy. In 2024, more than half of African countries derived at least 60 per cent of their export revenues from oil, gas or mineral commodities. Rising global demand and geopolitical competition over CRMs have strengthened Africa\u2019s strategic agency, prompting renewed efforts by the AU and mineral-rich states to use resource endowments as levers for industrial devel\u00adopment and thereby increase local value addition. Though long articulated \u2013 most notably in the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) of 2009 \u2013 this ambition has become a political focus once again.<\/p>\n

Against the backdrop of the global green energy transition and the associated grow\u00ading demand for minerals, the AU\u2019s African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), to\u00adgether with the African Development Bank (AfDB), began work on the AGMS in 2022; the strategy was formally adopted in March 2025. Building on the AMV, it aims to strengthen continental coordination and strategic positioning amid intensified global competition by promoting regional initia\u00adtives, such as shared infrastructure and the development of green industrial value chains. Implementation is to be supported by a Green Minerals Development Fund and public\u2013private investment platforms, among other instruments. Mineral steward\u00adship and environmental, social and govern\u00adance (ESG) standards are identified as pre\u00adrequisites for sustainable development and as means of strengthening the global com\u00adpetitiveness of African producers.<\/p>\n

But significant institutional challenges persist. While progress is being made under the industrial pillars of the African Conti\u00adnental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), negotiations on raw materials remain particularly sensitive. Moreover, the AMDC, whose man\u00addate is to support the implementation of con\u00adtinental strategies and related instru\u00adments, has not yet been fully ratified; thus, there is no access to regular AU budget funding. At least 15 AU member states must ratify the establishment of the centre; as of the end of 2025, only four of the 55 mem\u00adbers of the AU had completed that process \u2013 Nigeria being the last to do so and major con\u00adtinental mining producers such as Ghana and South Africa still not having voted on the issue. Overlapping initiatives \u2013 includ\u00ading the Africa Minerals Strategy Group (AMSG), which, launched at the Future Min\u00aderals Forum in Riyadh in 2024 (with Saudi Arabia as observer) \u2013 pursue similar objec\u00adtives but operate outside formal AU institu\u00adtional frameworks. As a result, continental coordination and the harmonisation of standards and operational practices remain a work in progress (as in the EU) while sup\u00adport to member states continues to fall short.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the political momentum is increasingly shifting to national capi\u00adtals. Governments across Africa are becom\u00ading more and more assertive. Many are advancing new critical mineral strategies to capture greater value at home through ex\u00adport restrictions, processing targets and in\u00advestment incentives. The strategies recently published or being drawn up by Zambia, South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania reveal the characteristics of various forms of resource nationalism and balance openness to in\u00advestment with stronger state intervention.<\/p>\n

The new critical mineral strategies are primarily national in scope. Links to con\u00adtinental frameworks such as the AMGS are limited, and political ambition has not yet been translated into implementation through regional initiatives. The most prominent of such initiatives \u2013 the Zambia\u2013DRC battery cluster \u2013 has attracted considerable atten\u00adtion but made only modest progress to date.<\/p>\n

Navigating global competition<\/p>\n

African governments have voiced the ambi\u00adtion of assuming a more influential role in global mineral governance in order to promote their industrialisation goals amid intensifying geopolitical competition.<\/p>\n

South Africa has positioned itself as a key African champion of multilateral min\u00aderal governance. It co-chairs the UN Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, while its G20 Presidency in 2025 marked a milestone in putting critical minerals firmly on the agenda. The Leaders\u2019 Decla\u00adration, adopted in November 2025, wel\u00adcomed the establishment of a G20 Critical Minerals Framework and explicitly ad\u00addressed the priorities of mineral-producing countries, which were identified as value addition, local beneficiation and sustain\u00adable mining. At the same time, the docu\u00adment recognised the supply security con\u00adcerns of import-dependent economies, such as European member states.<\/p>\n

Translating political commitments into favourable industrial outcomes for African producers remains a complex undertaking. Structural constraints \u2013 most notably, those restricting access to capital and tech\u00adnology \u2013 continue to reinforce the asym\u00admetry of global market relations. In addi\u00adtion, high investment needs in the area of infrastructure development (especially transport and energy), which are crucial not only for mining operations but also for downstream projects and industries, often exceed domestic capacities to provide such fund\u00ading, leaving African governments reliant on external partners.<\/p>\n

But contrary to what many European policymakers still believe, African governments are not idly waiting for European offers in the mining sector. Interest in the continent is high among both long-standing and new partners and investors, with the latter moving quickly to secure their stra\u00adtegic interests. China continues to consolidate its dominant position, with the main goal of ensuring access to minerals and maintaining its global industrial lead. Gulf states are significantly expanding their resource diplomacy and acquiring strategic mining assets, while India and Turkey, among others, are increasing their mining and manufacturing footprint. For its part, the US under Trump is pursuing a distinctly transactional and bilateral approach, grounded either in political trust in and support from the US government or in the use of coercive tools such as tariffs; overall, with limited value for building long-term industrial partnerships.<\/p>\n

African governments are keenly aware of the strategic interests of those driving this external engagement. Rather than favouring one partner over another, most govern\u00adments are seeking to navigate the competing bids in the minerals sector by choosing external actors based on their ability to deliver tangible investments and concrete industrial outcomes.<\/p>\n

Ambitions and constraints of EU raw material cooperation<\/p>\n

At first glance, the EU appears well posi\u00adtioned: African governments remain open to new partners, and both sides are inter\u00adested in more sustainable and resilient min\u00aderal value chains. On closer examination, however, it is evident that priorities differ: the EU\u2019s focus is on supply security and industrial resilience, while African govern\u00adments emphasise investment and indus\u00adtrial development. The two agendas are not incompatible and the foundations for co\u00adopera\u00adtion are in place. The key challenge lies in strengthening the execution and delivery of cooperative projects.<\/p>\n

Partnerships and projects<\/p>\n

Since 2021, the EU has significantly ex\u00adpanded its engagement in the mineral sec\u00adtor. The CRMA, adopted in April 2024, an\u00adchors Europe\u2019s strategy for reducing depend\u00adencies and diversifying supply chains by explicitly recognising the need for external partnerships with mineral-rich countries.<\/p>\n

To date, the EU Commission has concluded 15 official CRM partnerships with countries around the world, including five African states: Rwanda (currently paused), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Namibia and, more recently, South Africa (see Figure 1). At the same time, the EU is exploring a Clean Trade and Investment Partnership (CTIP) with South Africa, which is intended to facilitate industrial cooperation. And it continues to conduct a structured dialogue with the AU.<\/p>\n

These initiatives have increased EU vis\u00adibility in the mining sector on the African continent. The uniform template used for all CRM partnerships commits to cooperation across five areas: 1) supply-chain inte\u00adgration, 2) infrastructure financing, 3) re\u00adsearch and innovation, 4) capacity-building and 5) sustainable and responsible sourc\u00ading. Implementation is guided by bilateral roadmaps and pursued under the Team Europe approach, whereby the EU, the indi\u00advidual member states and the bloc\u2019s various institutions join forces.<\/p>\n

In practice, cooperation has advanced most clearly in governance-related areas (3\u20135), where the EU has built a recognised comparative advantage. In Zambia, for exam\u00adple, the government values technical assis\u00adtance in resource governance and environ\u00admental management. South Africa\u2019s signa\u00adture to its CRM partnership on the sidelines of the G20 summit sent a strong signal in support of multilateralism, amid heightened geopolitical tensions and the US boy\u00adcott of the summit. Pretoria explicitly wel\u00adcomed the EU\u2019s commitment to support not only South Africa\u2019s value-addition efforts but also the improved governance of CRMs.<\/p>\n

While development-oriented instruments are well suited to deliver on govern\u00adance, sustainability and capacity-building objectives, they are less effective in mobilis\u00ading CRM investment and accelerating indus\u00adtrial projects, which is what African part\u00adners are expecting. To help close this gap, the EU has started launching its strategic raw material projects. The first such projects were announced in 2025, including five in Africa (not all of which are partnership countries). They are intended to strengthen links between African producers and Euro\u00adpean industry. As Figure 1 shows, they com\u00adprise four mining projects (in Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa) and one refining project (in Zambia) and cover five of the CRMs included in the 2024 EU\u2019s list of 13 strategic raw materials.<\/p>\n

While the launch of these projects is an important step forward, the overall impact remains limited. To date, EU engagement has been confined largely to isolated flag\u00adship projects. The bloc needs to develop a more proactive and coordinated external project pipeline, rather than continuing to rely on the lengthy application-based pro\u00adcedures followed until now. More impor\u00adtant, project support \u2013 particularly fund\u00ading for private-sector engagement \u2013 remains slow in materialising and limited in scale, constraining the effectiveness of the EU strategy.<\/p>\n

State-business relations<\/p>\n

The EU\u2019s approach to critical raw materials remains market-based and relatively cau\u00adtious. As a result, its ability to deliver con\u00adcrete projects is lagging that of more asser\u00adtive actors in what is a strongly competitive CRM market.<\/p>\n

China \u2013 notably through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) \u2013 follows a state-led model that combines diplomatic support, state-backed finance and infrastructure investment to secure long-term offtake for its downstream industries. Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are rapidly expanding their footprint through sovereign wealth funds and strategic investments across min\u00ading and infrastructure sectors. And the US under Trump has stepped up its intervention, too, and is now deploying substantial public funds. In October 2025, the US Inter\u00adnational Development Finance Corporation (DFC) entered into a US$1.8 billion invest\u00adment consortium with two international investors (one from Abu Dhabi). Closer US\u2013Gulf cooperation in Africa had already been anticipated, with early consortium interest focused on a potential stake in a Glencore DRC mining asset. In February 2026, Washington launched the FORGE alliance, proposing a preferential trade zone and exploring price floors. This may accelerate US-backed projects in Africa, under \u201cAmerica First\u201d priorities and con\u00additioned by political relations with the US government, while likely to prioritise extractive projects.<\/p>\n

In Europe, CRM projects and the construction of related infrastructure continue to depend mainly on voluntary private-sec\u00adtor engagement. European corporates have long tended to rely on market mechanisms while investment in overseas mining remains limited, with significantly higher levels from France than Germany. Despite growing geopolitical pressure to diversify mineral supply chains, this dynamic has not changed fundamentally. Private-sector engagement, particularly in upstream min\u00ading, still falls short of political expectations. There are several structural factors con\u00adstraining engagement: equity stakes in mining projects are extremely capital-inten\u00adsive, they require long-term commitments and they also entail high commercial and reputational risks. As a result, such invest\u00adments are feasible only for a small number of firms. Furthermore, both real and, in some cases, exaggerated risk perceptions weigh heavily on Africa as an investment destination. The business-to-business rela\u00adtionships between local and European com\u00adpanies remain small in number. Indeed, hesitation was evident from the limited par\u00adticipation of European firms in the Lobito business forum in Zambia in late 2025, which were aimed at attracting interest in the local mining sector.<\/p>\n

At the same time, long-term engagement is crucial. Opportunities to diversify mineral supply chains are structurally constrained: markets for critical minerals are often highly concentrated and offtake agreements se\u00adcured \u2013 largely in favour of Chinese buyers at present.<\/p>\n

Although the EU is Africa\u2019s most impor\u00adtant trading partner overall, it plays only a small role in the continent\u2019s mineral sector. Mineral trade flows are difficult to follow owing to their complexity, but the available data point to still small volumes of critical mineral exports to Europe. South Africa is an exception of sorts, particularly in the supply of platinum group metals and owing to its relatively larger industrial base. Else\u00adwhere, value-chain integration between the two continents remains underdeveloped, highlighting the importance of effective project delivery for mineral cooperation.<\/p>\n

The Global Gateway gap<\/p>\n

A dedicated and well-coordinated external financing architecture is not provided for in the CRMA. As a result, the EU\u2019s ability to support cooperation with African partners in a strategic and efficient manner con\u00adtinues to be restricted. Despite early calls for an EU-level raw materials fund and inte\u00adgrated instruments that would combine pub\u00adlic finance and de-risking tools for projects with technical assistance, there has been little commitment in this regard. For this reason, external engagement continues to rely on a fragmented set of existing instru\u00adments.<\/p>\n

In practice, the EU\u2019s external engagement over CRMs on the African continent is channelled through the Global Gateway, launched in 2021 by the Von der Leyen Commission as the EU\u2019s global infrastructure and connectivity initiative. The Global Gateway does not constitute a single financ\u00ading instrument; rather, it brings together EU tools \u2013 notably, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) \u2013 and financial contributions from member states under the Team Europe approach. By crowding in private investment, the ini\u00adtia\u00adtive initially aimed to mobilise \u20ac300 billion between 2021 and 2027, including \u20ac150 bil\u00adlion for Africa. In October 2025, the Com\u00admission announced that the overall target had already been exceeded.<\/p>\n

In its current institutional design, the Global Gateway is difficult to operationalise as an effective and strategic instrument. Diffused responsibilities within the EU and its member states, combined with unclear access modalities for the private sector, are complicating factors for coherent implemen\u00adtation. Significant gaps remain in the areas of project-pipeline transparency, project delivery and the mobilisation of private capital.<\/p>\n

Moreover, integrating the raw material agenda into the Global Gateway proved chal\u00adlenging from the outset. When the CRMA was adopted in 2024, the EU\u2019s cur\u00adrent Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was already halfway through its seven year mandate (2021\u201327) and most Global Gateway\u2013related budgets had already been allocated, limiting the scope for the funding of additional projects. While some flagship initiatives have been launched \u2013 including the Lobito Corridor as an enabling infra\u00adstructure project in Southern Africa \u2013 the EU has yet to translate political ambition into concrete CRM projects with higher private-sector involvement.<\/p>\n

Future delivery of such projects hinges on the allocation of dedicated financial resources and thus on the negotiations over the next MFF (2028\u201334), which are set to intensify in 2026. In July 2025, the EU Com\u00admission proposed consolidating its external action instruments into a \u20ac200.3 billion \u201cGlobal Europe\u201d instrument, with geograph\u00adically oriented pillars. Although \u20ac60.5 bil\u00adlion was earmarked for Sub-Saharan Africa, those funds have to cater to competing pri\u00adorities that range from migration to hu\u00admanitarian assistance. Thus, the sum is un\u00adlikely to prove sufficient to meet the scale required for comprehensive CRM engage\u00adment.<\/p>\n

The EIB will play a decisive role in the European external CRM engagement. Its impact will be greatest if it acts not merely as a technical financier but as a strategic actor. Its willingness or clear mandate to engage in high-risk, capital-intensive projects out\u00adside the EU will be central to the credibility of Europe\u2019s diversification efforts and its CRM partnerships in today\u2019s highly compe\u00adtitive global environment. In March 2025, the bank adopted a Critical Raw Material Strategic Initiative, signalling its increased engagement along the value chain, and an\u00adnounced an annual spending target of \u20ac2 bil\u00adlion for the sector. Those funds are likely to account for a major part of the \u20ac3 billion announced under the RESourceEU Action Plan in December 2025. Just how much financing will ultimately be available for non-EU projects remains uncertain, how\u00adever.<\/p>\n

Given the limited resources within the EU, more effective coordination is essential in order to maximise impact. The EU has taken initial steps towards institutional in\u00adnovation. The Global Gateway Investment Hub is intended to function as a single-entry platform for companies. They shall submit investment proposals through government-led \u201cTeam Nationals\u201d platforms, aiming to ensure aligning projects with EU and part\u00adner priorities while maximising coordinated national and European support. Effective coordination and collaboration is essential due to account for the realities of the raw material sector. Capital-intensive mining projects involve high risk and require multi-billion euro financing packages, as illus\u00adtrated by Vulcan Energy\u2019s lithium project in Germany, which relies on a multi-actor financing package of around \u20ac2 billion.<\/p>\n

At the same time, access for firms to EU financing is challenging, particularly for non-European firms, as requirements and due-diligence procedures are rigid and com\u00adplex, and support limited in scale. That situa\u00adtion could be remedied, at least in part, through the closer coordination between EU-level instruments and member-state tools. Several member states \u2013 including France, Germany and the Netherlands \u2013 have established dedicated raw material funds that can be used to achieve complementarity, particularly in the case of large, value chain-integrated projects and major infrastructure corridors. Uncoordinated national initiatives risk undermining the EU\u2019s credibility. Italy\u2019s \u20ac320 million pledge to the Zambian part of the Lobito Corridor, which was made outside the established coordination channels, exemplifies how unilateral action can weaken EU collective visibility and delivery.<\/p>\n

Finally, proposals for enhanced coordination under the Global Gateway highlight the need to more closely integrate export credit agencies (ECAs) into the initiative. If tasked with earlier engagement and active risk-sharing, ECAs can add value by de-risk\u00ading capital-intensive raw material projects. For its part, Germany offers relevant experi\u00adence with its untied loan guarantees (UFKs), which could be leveraged more systematically. In 2024, there were 14 such guarantees in place, with just one other being ap\u00adproved during that year. Thus, the available coverage capacity is still far from being fully utilised.<\/p>\n

Conclusion and policy recommendations<\/p>\n

The AU-EU Summit in November 2025 con\u00adfirmed that there is a large degree of politi\u00adcal alignment in what is becoming an in\u00adcreasingly fragmented global order. Critical raw materials featured prominently on the agenda of the summit, reflecting the impor\u00adtant role these commodities play in geo\u00adeconomic competition and the industrial strategies of the two continents. There is a clear overlap of interests in Africa\u2019s ambi\u00adtion to leverage mineral resources for in\u00addustrial development and Europe\u2019s need to diversify and de-risk supply chains. At a time when multilateral cooperation can no longer be taken for granted, resilient min\u00aderal supply chains demand credible partner\u00adships. The structured dialogue with the AU, combined with the bilateral CRM agreements and the launch of the first strategic projects, provides a solid institutional foun\u00addation for such partnerships. Accelerating project delivery and scaling up industrial projects are the main tests of the EU\u2019s cred\u00adibility as a partner in today\u2019s highly com\u00adpetitive environment.<\/p>\n

For its part, the EU needs to ensure that Africa is anchored more firmly in its raw material strategy. It must also shift away from its development-oriented approach and instruments. While technical assistance remains an important component of the Euro\u00adpean CRM offer, in areas such as min\u00aderal governance, standards and capacity building, CRM partnerships are increasingly being driven by industrial and geopolitical considerations. The work of the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) within the framework of bilateral CRM partnerships is important but cannot, in itself, constitute the primary organising logic of EU CRM engagement on the African continent. Depending on institutional capac\u00adity, the stronger involvement of indus\u00adtry-, trade- and energy-focused portfolios, par\u00adticularly that of the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneur\u00adship and SMEs (DG GROW), is essential. This would not only strengthen industrial co\u00adoperation and integrate technical and market expertise; it would also ensure greater strategic coherence across the EU\u2019s external actions.<\/p>\n

There are three main requirements for putting such a shift into practice. First, more robust external project pipelines must be developed and jointly defined. Building on continental frameworks such as the AGMS, project pipelines drawn up with African partners and supported by African financial institutions would improve alignment with African industrial priorities while responding to Europe\u2019s supply-security objectives.<\/p>\n

Second, project delivery depends on the availability and strategic use of finance. For this reason, CRM cooperation needs to become a more integral part of the EU\u2019s external financing architecture and em\u00adbedded in the next MFF, including through dedicated budgetary lines and the expanded use of blended finance for projects along mineral value chains and enabling infra\u00adstructure. This should be complemented by greater transparency regarding the EIB\u2019s RESourceEU commitment \u2013 in particular, the extent of its risk appetite and the scope of support for projects in African partner countries. At the same time, there should be no delay in enhancing coordination with\u00adin the Global Gateway framework, with the aim of improving systematic coordination between EU institutions and member states and, crucially, strengthening the role of national ECAs in addressing the high-risk, capital-intensive nature of CRM investments.<\/p>\n

Third, European companies are essential for project delivery. In particular, downstream offtake agreements are needed to provide long-term demand certainty and underpin public investment decisions. While public support remains vital in the current geoeconomic environment, com\u00adpanies must assume greater responsibility for building resilient mineral supply chains that support Europe\u2019s industrial competitiveness going forward.<\/p>\n

Within Team Europe, Germany can play a reinforcing role by advocating a stronger anchoring of the CRMA in the next MFF and supporting more coherent Global Gateway coordination with Brussels, under the lead\u00ader\u00adship of the Foreign Office. The contribution of the respective line ministries should be clearly defined: the Ministry for Eco\u00adnomic Cooperation and Development should expand support for external project pipe\u00adlines and technical assistance, while the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy should strengthen external economic in\u00adstru\u00adments, including UFKs, and embed Ger\u00admany\u2019s raw material policy in a coordinated European approach.<\/p>\n

source:swp<\/b><\/p>\n

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Africa-Press – Lesotho. African governments are entering the geopolitical competition over critical raw materials with a growing sense of strategic confidence. While the AU-EU Summit in Luanda in November 2025 reaffirmed political commitments on both sides, European initiatives continue to lose ground. It is true that the Critical Raw Materials Act has expanded the EU\u2019s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":84,"featured_media":66802,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2,6],"tags":[245],"class_list":["post-66803","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-all-news","category-files","tag-lesotho"],"yoast_head":"\nStrategic Raw Material Cooperation Between Africa and Europe - Lesotho<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"-article-header-tag"> Africa-Press - Lesotho. 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