Africa-Press – Mauritius. During our intervention in these same columns (Mauritius Times, May 11, 2012) on the political balance of power, we discussed the more or less stable electoral base of the country’s main parties.
According to our estimates, the MMM and PTr are around 40%, the MSM 2.5%, the PSMD 1.5%, and other 5% in terms of electoral support. Of the remaining 11%, 4% are rather close to MMM but hesitant.
The 7% are those who oscillate between the PTr and the MSM. This means that the electoral potential of the PTr and the MSM stands at 47% and 9.5% respectively, while the electoral potential of the MMM can be credited at 44%.
There is no indication that this data has since changed. The figures mentioned are calculated on the basis of the votes cast, not including abstention.
In order to get a more precise and clear picture of the forces present, it seemed appropriate to us to carry out the calculation on the basis of the totality of the registered voters.
We thus arrive at a representation, across the entire electorate, of 32% in the PTr and MMM, 2% in the MSM, 1% in the PMSD and 20% systemic abstention. Since the analysis of May 11, 2012, there have been several sequences rather unfavorable to the parliamentary majority.
It is possible to assess their impact on the majority-opposition balance of power based on the results of the municipal elections of December 2012 and the DCDM-Politis (L’express) polls.
1) The 2012 municipal elections
These municipalities seem interesting to us in more than one way: first, they cover 9 urban constituencies, more than half of which can be qualified as marginal or “swing constituencies” in the context of legislative elections.
They intervene in an eventful context and rather beneficial to the opposition: the end or the putting on the backburner of a PTr-MMM alliance and the relaunch of the MMM-MSM alliance, while certain alleged scandals have served as fuel for the municipal campaign of the Remake 2000 launched in pole position.
Despite the strong mobilization of the staffs of both camps and the circumstances favorable to a large participation comparable to urban legislative elections, there was a very high abstention rate that we will qualify as “abnormal” (see boxed text).
This behavior, which we attribute in large part to political abstention, affected, in almost the same proportion, the MMM and the PTr. As the contribution of MSM and PMSD is negligible on the whole, we only retain the results of the two main trainings.
Their performance is obviously very average, weighed down by the strong political abstention or protest. For the PTr, this is more easily explained, notably by the impact of the campaign built around the alleged “scandals” and a certain classic disenchantment.
What is most surprising is that of the MMM, which hoped, given the current economic situation, to conquer at least four municipalities. One of the most plausible reasons for the very poor performance of the MMM is the lack of enthusiasm of much of the Purple base towards an alliance with the MSM.
In addition, certain modalities provided for by the Remake seem difficult to accept, such as the granting of tickets to the MSM in the purple bastions, in particular at the level of constituencies 1 (Grande-Rivière-Nord-Ouest / Port-Louis Ouest), 17 (Curepipe / Midlands), 19 (Stanley / Rose Hill), 20 (Rodrigues).
That being said, the vast majority of these MMM abstainers will not stay at home in the next legislative elections. If necessary, they will carry their vote on the purple party, for lack of direct competitor to this party.
However, this situation is not without concern for the staff of the MMM. If the discontent is not evacuated by then, even a small fringe would be tempted to abstain. This could be damaging to the Remake in the face of an alliance led by the PTr in certain tight urban constituencies.
Another risk is the mixing which had already started to produce detrimental effects on MMM in 2010 – as in Nos 4 (Port Louis Nord / Montagne Longue) and 14 (Savanne / Rivière Noire).
As for the Labor non-voters in these municipal elections, a large majority of them will vote for the alliance led by their party. However, a fraction could be attracted by the direct political offer offered by the MSM.
As we have already analyzed, it is on the concretization in effective vote of the electoral potential represented by the fraction which oscillates between the PTr and the MSM that everything will be decided in the next legislative elections subject to a Labor Alliance-Remake confrontation.
In the end, it is clear that this realization did not occur as demonstrated by the municipal elections of 2010. There was no “shift” from part of the electorate who voted Labor in 2005 and 2010 to the MSM. The two main groups (PTr and MMM) have obviously suffered a serious setback.
Since we cannot compare the performance during the municipal elections of 2012 with that of the municipal districts of 2005 or 2000 (see boxed text), we retain the comparison with the legislative performances of 2000, 2005 and 2010 in the urban districts covered by the municipal.
If we take the votes cast as a basis for calculation, we do not see any backsliding. On the other hand, if we perform the calculation on registered voters, the regression is obvious. Ultimately, the gap between PTr and MMM remains stable.
What seems more relevant to us as a political observation is the behavior of the volatile fraction of the PTr, this decisive segment in the next legislative elections, subject to a Remake-Alliance battle led by the PTr.
Despite the difficult economic situation for the government majority, there was no shift in allegiance from the PTr to the MSM during these municipal elections.
Other sequences unfavorable to power and highly publicized will follow the municipal elections: the affair concerning a Labor activist, the MITD affair, the “under warning” interrogation lasting 16 hours in the CCID premises of the leader of the MSM, Pravind Jugnauth, in the MedPoint affair, the rise of the Remake campaign for May 1, the emotional charge surrounding the revelation of Paul Bérenger’s state of health, etc.
All of this was likely to have an impact on public opinion in a direction favorable to the opposition, knowing that the communication of the ruling majority in matters of crisis management was far from effective.
It was under these conditions that the DCDM-L’express political opinion poll was carried out from January to March 2013. For our study on the evolution of the balance of political power, we have retained the part of the survey devoted to partisan proximity.
2) The DCDM-Politis (L’express) poll – I
The conclusions of this survey on the affinity rating with political parties appear surprising given the gap between the PTr (35%: 3-month average – January to March 2013) and the MMM (18%).
At first glance, of course. For various reasons that we had already mentioned in these same columns, political polls are very difficult to conduct in Mauritius.
Among others: numerous and complicated segmentation criteria, a divisive political climate marked by clientelism, the size of the country “where everything is known”, a low “speakability” (the ease of saying one’s partisan choice), etc.
So the “snapshot”, taken from the political poll in Mauritius, is often “blurry”, and when not made “sharp”, it can indeed lead to disastrous interpretations .
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. as in 2000 in particular. The “photograph” of the express poll – at least on party affinity ratings – is blatantly blurry.
The poll reveals a proximity rating with the MMM of 18%, while referring to the technical “recollection of the vote”, inspired by the data recovery, we place it around 32% for the entire electorate.
The gap between the affinity rating established by the poll and the electoral base being too large, at 14%, it is necessary, for a more credible interpretation, to make a certain correction.
The explanation can be found among those who do not vote for any party or not at all, around 40%, according to the poll. Of these, 20% can be compared to the systemic abstention rate observed during the legislative elections.
So 20% remains. Among those who confirmed their dissatisfaction as expressed during the municipal elections. The vast majority, however, have a partisan preference but are unwilling to express it openly.
As the rate of “speakability” is lower among opposition supporters, it can be said that the largest fraction of those who did not speak out are in the MMM camp.
So by correcting the data and taking into account the margin of error, we can find the true affinity rating of the MMM, which is around 32%. When it comes to PTr, the proximity rating that the survey sets at 35% seems fair to us.
If we take into account the margin of error, this figure is close to our assessment of the strong electoral base of the PTr (32%). government majority to capture the volatile fringe of the PTr, there is no transfer of allegiance between these two formations.
3) DCDM-Politis II survey From the end of March to June, other unfortunate events for the government majority occurred: the floods, the Sorèze accident, the Varma affair.
It is in this context that the second political barometer was carried out by DCDM-Politis (the express). The sequences unfavorable to the government camp obviously did not have an impact on the balance of power.
After correcting the data, we estimate that the MMM and the PTr remain stuck around 32% of the electorate (or 40% of the votes cast). Despite the very favorable situation for Remake 2000, the electoral base of the PTr remains stable.
The MSM is not able, more than a year after the relaunch of the Remake and despite a favorable situation for the opposition, to bite convincingly on the fringe that can be described as volatile of the electorate who voted Labor in 2005 and 2010.
For several reasons, in particular: SAJ no longer has the same charisma as before, the difficulty for Pravind Jugnauth to take over, the doubt on the credibility of the MSM on “business” including MedPoint, the absence of concrete proposals from the MSM affecting the daily life of these voters.
Ultimately, despite the unfavorable circumstances for the PTr from May 2012 to June 2013, the balance of power between the Remake 2000 and the Alliance led by the PTr, with a view to a legislative meeting, has not changed.
In the next legislative elections, for lack of a direct competitor, the MMM will regain the vast majority of its electoral potential. However, a protest abstention, however small, can prove to be detrimental to the MMM.
As for the PTr, its electoral base will remain faithful to it no matter what. The big question is the behavior of these 6-7% of voters oscillating between the PTr and the MSM, who will probably decide on the eve of the legislative elections in a Remake v / s Labor Alliance configuration.
And this is not a given, neither for the PTr which has an interest in taking the threat seriously, nor for the MSM which, obviously, has great difficulty in convincing.
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