Africa-Press – Mozambique. Statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in which he accused Ukraine of acting against African governments friendly to Moscow, have highlighted an expanding rivalry between the two countries outside the direct battlefield, making Africa one of the arenas where both sides seek to enhance their political and security presence.
In a joint press conference with his Burundian counterpart in Bujumbura last Friday, following his meeting with President Évariste Ndayishimiye, Lavrov stated: “We are witnessing blatant examples of foreign intervention in African affairs, particularly where the legitimate government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supported by Burundi, is overcoming the aggression waged against it by the ‘M23’ movement, backed by foreign parties including Ukraine. We know this, and our allies know it too,” as reported by a local source.
The Russian minister added that Ukrainians are attempting, in many conflicts across the continent, to side with forces opposing legitimate governments in order to “establish themselves as a political actor in the region, and most importantly, create difficulties for countries friendly to Russia.”
These remarks came at the end of an African tour that included Addis Ababa, where Lavrov held consultations with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission Mahmoud Ali Yusuf, concluding with a joint statement on the partnership between Russia and the African Union. A Russian media outlet previously reported him saying that “Ukrainian mercenaries are actively participating in terrorist attacks” on the continent.
A Spark Preceded by a Rift in the Sahel
Moscow’s accusations are not the first of their kind. In July 2024, Tuareg rebels ambushed a convoy of the Malian army and Russian Wagner Group fighters near the town of Tinzawaten on the border with Algeria, claiming to have killed 84 members of the group and 47 Malian soldiers, marking the heaviest losses for Wagner since its entry into the country.
The spokesperson for Ukrainian military intelligence, Andriy Yusov, stated after the operation: “The fact that the rebels obtained the necessary data to carry out an operation against the Russians, and of course, we will not disclose the details.” However, Bamako considered his statements an acknowledgment of Kyiv’s involvement in the attack, announcing on August 4, 2024, the severing of diplomatic relations with Ukraine, describing it as “a blatant aggression against Mali and support for international terrorism,” a move later followed by Niger. Ukraine denied any involvement in the fighting, calling Bamako’s decision “short-sighted and hasty.”
Moscow relies on an extensive military and security presence in Africa, which began through the Wagner Group, active since 2017 in Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Sahel countries, providing protection and training in exchange for mining concessions, according to a local think tank. After the rebellion of its owner Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, its assets and personnel were transferred to the “African Legion” directly under the Russian Ministry of Defense, in addition to a state-funded media network operating on the continent.
In contrast, Kyiv has expanded its diplomatic presence after having only 11 missions in the continent before 2022, opening 8 new embassies over three years, and launched a special strategy for Africa in December 2023. It promoted the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, delivering about 300,000 tons of food aid to 12 countries, and President Volodymyr Zelensky visited South Africa in 2025 on his first African trip.
The local think tank pointed to another aspect of this presence, which is the dispatch of around 100 special forces personnel by Ukrainian military intelligence to Khartoum in August 2023 to assist the Sudanese army in facing the Rapid Support Forces, which were then supported by Wagner, conducting drone strikes and nighttime operations in the Sudanese capital.
The report concluded that Ukraine’s covert operations against Russian targets undermined its diplomatic efforts, making it appear to African governments as “another foreign power investing in African instability,” while the number of African countries voting in favor of condemning Russia in the UN General Assembly decreased from 25 in 2023 to 13 in 2025.
