By Wakjira Tesfaye Beriso
Africa-Press – Ethiopia. September 23, 2025 12 minutes read Addis Abeba – Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have long been an important part of political participation in Ethiopia. From idir and iqub, informal mutual aid cooperatives, to professional NGOs that document human rights, provide humanitarian relief, and mobilize voters, these groups give ordinary people a voice in decisions that shape their lives. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, his government promised a break with the past and enacted a new Civil Societies Organizations Proclamation No. 1113/2019 that replaced the draconian 2009 charities law. The 2019 law eliminated the ban on receiving foreign funding for human rights work, created a more representative regulatory body, and allowed CSOs to appeal regulatory decisions in court. It enabled local and diaspora‐supported organizations to blossom and contributed to the limited opening of political space ahead of the 2021 elections.
That momentum has since dissipated. The country has been rocked by war in Tigray, communal violence across several regions, restrictions on media, internet shutdowns, and a resurgence of political arrests. Yet the honeymoon season was short-lived. Just six years after the 2019 overhaul of the CSO regime, civil society faces its most serious threat since the end of the Derg: in July 2025, the Ministry of Justice, working with the Authority for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO), circulated draft amendments to the 2019 proclamation that would reassert state control by handing federal authorities sweeping powers to deny registration, suspend or dissolve organizations on vague “national security” grounds, and prohibit foreign funding for groups engaged in governance or election-related work.
The warning signs are already visible: in 2024 alone, ACSO reportedly dissolved at least 1,504 CSOs for alleged administrative non-compliance; several human rights groups were suspended or deregistered; and journalists were harassed, detained, or pushed into exile. Human Rights Watch has called the proposals a grave rollback, while FIDH and OMCT describe them as a “major step backwards” that would effectively criminalize independent civil society. With national elections slated for June 2026, such restrictions threaten to shrink civic space precisely when independent scrutiny is most needed.
These trends raise urgent questions about the future of Ethiopian democracy and the government’s willingness to honor its constitutional and international obligations. This article analyzes the proposed amendments, examines how they contravene Ethiopia’s constitution and human rights treaties, and argues that the law would severely restrict civic space at a critical juncture in the country’s political transition. It draws on the draft law itself, statements from human rights organizations, and commentary by scholars and activists. The conclusion calls for the Ethiopian government to abandon the repressive proposals and work with civil society to strengthen, rather than destroy, the country’s fragile democratic gains.
From repression to reform, return to repression
Ethiopia’s civil society sector was effectively muzzled after the disputed 2005 elections. In January 2009, Parliament enacted the Proclamation for Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies. The Law Library of Congress summarized key provisions: it established an oversight agency, imposed detailed rules on the registration and financing of trusts and endowments, and restricted work on “human and democratic rights, gender or ethnic equality, conflict resolution [and] strengthening judicial practices” to Ethiopian organizations that obtained no more than 10% of their funding from foreign sources. Critics described the law as a deliberate scheme to stifle voluntary initiatives and disrupt aid operations. Groups receiving more than 10% foreign funding were reclassified as “foreign charities” and banned from human rights advocacy, a rule enforced alongside onerous reporting requirements and intrusive oversight that pushed many organizations toward closure or exile. The net effect was to equate independent rights work with “foreign interference,” chilling domestic monitoring and advocacy across the sector.
The 2019 Civil Societies Organizations Proclamation reversed many of these measures. It allowed both domestic and international organizations to receive funds from any legal source, including foreign donors, and to engage in income-generating activities to support their objectives. The law capped administrative expenses at 20% of income and required annual audits for larger organizations but opened space for advocacy and rights-based work; these were operationalized through implementing directives, including the Administrative Expense Implementation Directive No. 847/2021 and the Audit & Performance Reporting Directive No. 972/2023. While it still barred foreign organizations from lobbying political parties or conducting voter education, Ethiopian charities funded by foreign donors could engage in these activities. The ACSO board comprised seven members representing civil society groups, including women’s and disability organizations, with the Justice Ministry appointing only a minority—an institutional design meant to insulate oversight from direct executive control (ACSO, 2019). The result was a surge in registration and a flowering of civic engagement; ICNL notes a “rejuvenation and mushrooming” of CSOs and records 2,953 organizations registered by July 2021, signaling a real (if uneven) reopening of civic space.
The optimism of 2019 soon gave way to renewed repression. In July 2024 the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders reported that the ACSO had dissolved at least 1,504 organizations for failing to submit annual reports, noting that many lacked the resources to meet onerous administrative requirements. These closures, FIDH argued, created a climate of fear and isolation, effectively silencing grassroots organizations. Human rights groups and journalists faced increasing harassment: in December 2024 the ACSO suspended the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), the Centre for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), and the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE) for alleged lack of independence.
CARD and LHR briefly had their suspensions lifted but were swiftly re-banned. Freedom House’s 2025 country report noted that journalists and CSOs faced arbitrary arrests, intimidation, and forced self-censorship, and that several prominent NGOs were suspended during 2024. These events signal a broader trend of shrinking civic space. FIDH documented that since 2019 Ethiopian authorities have arrested around 200 journalists and forced many human rights defenders into exile. In January 2025, Human Rights Watch condemned the government for suspending major human rights organizations, describing it as part of a “relentless assault against human rights groups.” The crackdown suggests that the government is using administrative regulations to target outspoken organizations and erode independent oversight ahead of the 2026 elections. Against this backdrop, the July 2025 draft amendments appear less a technical revision and more an attempt to institutionalize state control.
Authoritarian echoes in proposed CSO law
The draft revisions have a clear propensity to re-entrench the authoritarian controls that defined the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation. The first of such changes is the restructuring of the ACSO Board. Under the 2019 law the board had 11 members with seven seats for civil-society representatives; the draft would cut it to seven, give five appointments and the chair to the Ministry of Justice, and leave only two CSO seats. Such concentration of appointment and chairing power in the Justice Ministry makes the regulator subordinate to the very executive it is meant to be independent from, creating a structural conflict that contravenes international standards on freedom of association, which require independent and plural oversight as well as access to judicial remedies, and undermines Ethiopia’s constitutional guarantees of association and access to justice, enabling politicized gatekeeping of registration and punitive suspensions that chill watchdog work.
The draft revisions have a clear propensity to re-entrench the authoritarian controls that defined the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation.”
The second is the expansion of suspension and dissolution on vague “national security” grounds: today, Article 77 of the 2019 Proclamation permits suspension only after an investigation confirms a serious legal violation, caps it at three months, and allows appeal to the federal courts, as Addis Standard explains; the draft would allow suspension or dissolution on mere “suspicion of a serious legal violation” or a prediction of “irreparable harm,” extend suspensions to six months, enable freezing of bank accounts, make the ACSO board’s decision final (removing court review), and let the authority deny registration whenever it “believes” a group threatens national security.
A third pillar revives foreign-funding prohibitions for “political” work: the draft would bar international organizations and foreign-funded domestic CSOs (including those supported by the diaspora) from political advocacy, civic and voter education, election observation, or any election-related work, and would even forbid foreign technical or financial support to local groups for election activities; “political advocacy” is left undefined, a vagueness that could sweep in routine public-interest and human-rights work, starving watchdogs that rely on diaspora support and codifying executive control over civic life.
Fourth, onerous administrative burdens and asset freezes: the draft would force organizations to report any foreign support within 15 working days, seek prior permission to open bank accounts or borrow funds, and allow authorities to freeze assets and bank accounts during suspensions, with parallel provisions for freezing bank accounts during investigations. The text escalates minor administrative lapses, late financial reports, and address updates into grounds for suspension or license revocation. This is not hypothetical: in 2024 the authority dissolved 1,504 CSOs for reporting failures, a pattern driven as much by resource constraints as by misconduct, and the draft would harden those practices into permanent tools of control.
Fifth, elimination of judicial oversight and public participation: the 2019 proclamation and practitioner commentary recognized a right to appeal ACSO decisions to the Federal High Court. The draft instead makes the board’s decision final and removes court review, a shift at odds with Article 37 of the Constitution on access to justice. The process also sidelines the public: Ethiopia’s Administrative Procedure Proclamation requires agencies to notify stakeholders and invite comments before adopting directives, yet consultations on the amendments were limited to a selected group, and sector actors like CARD have already flagged irregular, non-transparent rule-making.
The draft proclamation violates, among other rights, the following fundamental constitutional guarantees and international standards:
Freedom of association and assembly
Article 31 of the FDRE Constitution protects the right to form associations for any purpose, and Article 30 guarantees peaceful assembly, yet the draft relies on vague triggers such as “national security” and “irreparable harm” that permit shutdowns without proof of illegal conduct. It also bans foreign-funded groups from “political” activity, civic and voter education, and election observation, curbing participation in public affairs. By removing judicial appeals and making the ACSO board’s decisions final, enforcement is left to an executive-controlled regulator rather than independent courts.
2. Freedom of expression and access to information
Article 29 protects the right to hold opinions and to seek, receive, and impart information, but the draft imposes content-based restrictions on speech by foreign-funded CSOs without any showing of concrete threat to public order. Under international law, ICCPR Article 22 permits restrictions only when they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, while African Charter Article 10 safeguards free association. The African Commission’s Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly and Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan make clear that vague national-security clauses cannot justify dissolving or disabling associations.
3. Legality, necessity, and proportionality
The draft fails legality because key terms are undefined, fails necessity because bans on foreign support for civic education and election observation lack an evidence-based link to specific harms, and fails proportionality because administrative lapses or diaspora-funded advocacy are punished with dissolution rather than tailored oversight, contrary to ICCPR Article 22’s standards.
4. Right to due process and fair trial
Article 37 guarantees access to the courts for justiciable disputes, and both the ICCPR and African Charter require independent judicial review of rights-restricting measures. By making the ACSO board the final arbiter while the board itself is dominated by Justice Ministry appointees, the draft eliminates effective remedies against arbitrary action, in tension with UDHR Article 8 on the right to an effective remedy and UDHR Article 21 on participation in public affairs.
5. Right to participation and consultation
Public participation in lawmaking is an integral part of democratic governance and is recognized in Ethiopia’s Administrative Procedure Proclamation No. 1183/2020. Guideline 32 of the Legislative Process and Drafting Manual requires the government to invite public comments on draft legislation, while Article 8 of the Administrative Procedure Proclamation obliges agencies to notify stakeholders and the public of their intent to issue directives. In practice, CSOs have criticized ACSO for issuing directives without meaningful consultation. CARD, a board-led CSO, convened a consultative meeting in August 2021 to highlight irregularities in ACSO rule-making. Many CSOs report that they were unaware of the draft amendments until they were leaked online. Such secretive drafting violates the spirit of participatory governance and further undermines trust in the reform process.
Practical implications of civil society bill
The broad prohibition on “political advocacy” and election-related work by foreign-funded CSOs would land hardest just as the country approaches the 2026 polls: many voter-education and election-observation efforts depend on international support, and cutting them off removes independent eyes from registration, campaigning, and tallying. Without plural monitors, contests become easier to manipulate and harder to de-escalate when disputes erupt. The danger is not abstract. As Yared Hailemariam, executive director of the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Centre (EHRDC), warns, the proposed law would mean “only state-approved organizations can speak about politics,” shrinking the information available to voters and insulating incumbents from scrutiny. The draft also layers on compliance traps, requiring CSOs to report any foreign support within 15 working days, seek prior approval to open bank accounts, and accept freezes of assets during investigations, turning routine administration into grounds for punishment and exit.
The broad prohibition on political advocacy and election-related work by foreign-funded CSOs would land hardest just as the country approaches the 2026 polls….”
The result is structural resource starvation, felt most acutely outside major cities. The 2019 law’s opening to foreign funding acknowledged that domestic philanthropy is thin; reversing that premise forces closures, especially among rural groups that carry out civic education, mediation, and rights documentation on shoestring budgets. The state has already shown how bureaucratic levers can be weaponized: in 2024, authorities dissolved 1,504 CSOs for alleged reporting failures, a number that signals capacity constraints, not mass malfeasance. In a setting still grappling with conflict and humanitarian need, the government should welcome independent scrutiny and criticism; instead, the amendments amount to a de facto criminalization of independent civil society. Beyond the domestic costs, Ethiopia has bound itself to ICCPR obligations and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and, through Article 9 of the Constitution, to give international agreements internal legal effect; a law that sidelines watchdogs, gags election support, and substitutes administrative fiat for judicial remedies invites reputational damage, adverse findings by regional and UN mechanisms, and real risks to external financing at a precarious moment.
Ethiopia’s draft does not appear in a vacuum; it mirrors the same control tools seen in Russia’s foreign-agent rules and the Georgia “foreign influence” law that the Venice Commission found incompatible with basic legality and necessity tests. Ethiopia has its own history with this approach: the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation cut independent groups off from international support and forced closures, while the 2019 framework reopened space and was cited as a regional reference for balancing oversight and civic freedom. The current draft re-creates the same machinery bans on foreign-funded advocacy and election work, elastic “national security” triggers, and administrative chokepoints at the precise moment the 2026 vote will need independent voter education and observation to prevent escalation and build trust.
The likely outcomes are concrete and measurable. Regulators could freeze bank accounts during investigations, suspend organizations on “suspicion” and deny registration, and replace court review with an executive-dominated board. Rural and community-based groups, already thinly financed, would be hit first; the authorities’ dissolution of 1,504 CSOs in 2024 shows how paperwork has already become a sanction. Cutting off outside support would shutter civic-education projects, shrink monitoring networks, and delay early warnings when tensions rise. The direction also clashes with binding obligations under ICCPR Article 22 and African Charter Article 10, commitments that carry domestic force through Article 9 of the Constitution. Comparative evidence is clear: where laws of this type take hold, labels and reporting turn into compliance traps, election seasons lose neutral educators and observers, and international partners reassess political risk patterns already flagged by rights monitors urging rejection of the draft and echoed in regional commentary.
What follows from this is not rhetoric but a policy choice with foreseeable costs. Keeping the ban on foreign-funded public-interest and election work will thin out citizen observers and leave complaints to fester; widening “security” clauses will license arbitrary suspensions; sidelining courts will erode remedies. The alternative is available and already tested in Ethiopia: retain the 2019 baseline, replace prohibitions with transparent disclosure and auditing, define risk narrowly and require evidence before any sanction, and reopen drafting under the consultation duties in the Administrative Procedure Proclamation. Without those corrections, the signal to domestic actors is to self-censor or relocate; the signal to external partners is to price in higher political risk, with tighter funding and sharper findings from regional and UN mechanisms. With them, Ethiopia preserves scrutiny when it matters most, keeps civic intermediaries active where conflict risk is highest, and aligns election management with the standards it has already pledged to uphold.
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