Justice Emile Short and President Nana Akufo-Addo
The Akufo-Addo led Government recently released the full report of the three-member Commission of Inquiry that probed the Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election gun violence.
The Commission of Inquiry was established on 8 February 2019 by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo to make a full, faithful and impartial enquiry into the circumstances of, and establish the facts leading to, the events and associated violence during the Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election held on the 31 January 2019.
The three-member Committee was headed by the former boss of the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and comprised Prof. Henrietta Bonsu and Patrick K. Acheampong.
Read below the full recommendations of the Justice Emile Short Commission report:
RECOMMENDATIONS
STRUCTURAL
1.1. The Commission recommends that the president should review and restructure the Ministry of National Security establishment with a view to ensuring clarity of responsibilities and roles as well as lines of reporting.
1.2. The Commission recommends the establishment of a standing command and control center tasked inter alia with the role of assessing and processing intelligence for rapid deployment. This center will incorporate key officers of allied internal security agencies, including the police, military, national security, fire service, customs etc.
1.3. The Minister of State appointed at the presidency to the Ministry of National Security should have a clearly delineated role with responsibilities indexed to that of substantive sector minister. This should establish a clear chain of command and the circumstances under which he or she can act in the absence of the substantive Minister.
OPERATIONAL
2.1. It is recommended that as a matter of urgency, the police and national security establishment develop protocols for the assessment and rating of intelligence received; and subsequent deployment of missions, if any.
2.2. The Commission recommends that no masked or hooded men should be used for civilian policing, especially in electoral policing or the execution of intelligence contingent on, or connected with, any ongoing elections in Ghana.
2.3. The Commission recommends that SWAT teams and police officers deployed to maintain the peace and order on electoral grounds must have rigorous training in crowd control, arrests and perimeter security for both the ongoing electoral exercises and for any allied security issues that may emerge in an ancillary fashion.
2.4. The Commission recommends that standard rules and procedures for the issuance of weapons and ammunition to police officers and operatives of the national security who are sent on missions and accompanying rules of accountability for these weapons and ammunitions should be enforced.
2.5. The Commission recommends that intelligence-based agencies should operate under the law and be guided by the fundamental human rights of citizens .In this vein, the Commission also recommends that operatives of the National Security Council should be trained to internalize human rights rules including the provisions on the fundamental human rights of the Constitution within their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
2.6. The Commission recommends a strict adherence to the rules on searches and seizures, especially as regards to respect for the privacy of the citizen. Consequently, the Commission recommends that a ministerial directive be issued reminding all state operatives of the need to respect the citizen’s privacy except as authorized by judicial orders.
2.7. The Commission recommends that the SWAT team of the National Security Council Secretariat should be disbanded and operatives be reassigned as appropriate.
2.8. The Commission further recommends that support for special operations should be sought from the specialized units of the police directly as and when necessary.
2.9. The Commission recommends intelligence sharing between relevant agencies where an operation would entail or necessitate inter-agency cooperation, such as the operation that has formed the subject of this inquiry. The police should be better resourced so that they can maintain active communication during the entirety of operations. Providing equipment to only the leaders of an operation who cannot be everywhere at once leaves the flank unprotected and this would not inspire confidence in any of them.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITIES
3.1. The Commission recommends the criminal prosecution of Mr. Ernest Akomea alias ‘Double’ for the unauthorized possession of firearms under section 192(1) of the Criminal Offences Act.
3.2. The Commission recommends the criminal prosecution for the offence of assault, to wit, the slapping of Mr. Samuel George by Mohammed Sulemana.
3.3. The Commission recommends the immediate removal of DSP Samuel Kojo Azugu from command responsibility at the Ministry of National Security given his failure to appropriately command and control the SWAT team of which he had charge during the operation at the La Bawaleshie school polling station. It is recommended that he should be reassigned by the IGP.
3.4. The Commission recommends the reprimand of Colonel Mike Opoku, for being ultimately responsible for the outcome of the SWAT operation at the La Bawaleshie School Polling Station. His liability is further reinforced by his failure to properly define the mission for which the SWAT team was sent and ensuring that the SWAT team complied with the defined mission .Further, he failed to conduct and internal inquiry into identifying the culprits of the offence when revelations became rife that there were operational lapses resulting in violations of human rights.
3.5. It is further recommended, that Col. Opoku be made to immediately release the weapons used for, as well as the persons involved in ,the operation to enable ballistic testing and analysis to be undertaken and for further investigations by the police.
3.6. The Commission recommends that Mr. Bryan Acheampong be reprimanded for his ultimate responsibility as Minister in authorizing an operation of that character on a day of an election in a built up area.
COMPENSATIONS
4.1. The Commission recommends the payment of financial compensation to the following persons on the basis of injuries sustained by them arising out of the reckless gunshots by the SWAT team, and that is to say :
Mr. Theophilus Sedofu
Seidu Zaneh
3.James Moore
Mohammed Alhassan
Ishawu Yaro
4.2. The Commission recommends payment of compensation to the following persons for damage caused to their properties.
Owner of vehicle (model unknown) with registration number GE 3844-17.
Owner of Kia Picanto vehicle with registration number GW 1045-17.
Mrs. Justine She, Owner of beauty salon bordering the road.
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. The commission recommends that the structure of reporting within the national security set up needs to be revised. It is recommended that the National Security Coordinator be elevated to the first level of being reported to by subordinate security officers.
5.2. The Commission recommends that the roles and responsibilities within the set-up be streamlined and clarified.
5.3. The Commission recommends that the police should review their recruitment procedures and install merit-based criteria to ensure that the most qualified, and not the most well-connected, persons are enlisted.
5.4. The Commission recommends the immediate criminalization of the establishment and/or funding and other support for militia organizations in Ghana.
5.5. The Commission recommends the opening of a criminal investigation into the circulation of posters of certain persons who may have taken part in the botched exercise in the Ayawaso West Wuogon Constituency as part of the SWAT team and the said perpetrators bought to book.
5.6. The Commission recommend for the consideration of the Medical and Dental Council to remind their members to comply with the legal duty to endorse police forms issued in respect of victims to whom they may have provided services –the subject of ongoing criminal investigations.
5.7.The urges, for the consideration of the Electoral Commission ,that the EC should explore the possibility of resorting to electronic voting or some other method which does not depend on physical ballot boxes.
5.8. The Commission recommends that the Police should mount public education on crime –scene management to ensure that the public would avoid interfering with crime scenes and thereby protect the integrity of evidence for future prosecution.
5.9. The Commission recommends that an independent Police Complaints Commission based outside the Police structure should be established to deal with complaints from the public on the conduct of Police officers and so promote police accountability.
5.10. The Commission recommends that there should be a multi-stage process to enable all aspects of the problem of party associated militias and vigilantes to be appropriately explored.
CHAPTER 3
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ELECTORAL SECURITY
1.1. The maintenance of a safe and secure environment for the conduct of elections is vital for Ghana’s democratic governance. Regrettably, however, past elections have often been marred by incidents of violence and states of insecurity resulting in injuries and in some cases, loss of lives. It is therefore utterly important that the management of elections are promised on the assurance of security and optimal guarantees of safety on electoral grounds for the public to exercise their franchises without any fear.
1.2. The Commission finds that by-elections appear to focus the attention and competition between the parties on one constituency, thereby increasing the potential for violence.This fact should not be lost on the EC and the country at large and so no effort must be spared in making appropriate security management for the event.
1.3. The Commission finds, that while there was some semblance of security provided within the Ayawaso West Wuogon Constituency on the said day of the elections, the otherwise reasonable arrangement was abruptly disrupted by the SWAT team who though were not part of the arrangement, arrived on the scene unannounced.
1.4. In a related conclusion, the Commission finds that there was not sufficient prior coordination usually characteristic of such elections, between the electoral commission and the security services, notably the police service on the issue of the security needs of the EC for a successful conduct of elections within the constituency. This finding is especially troubling given the importance of coordination in ensuring a proper mapping of the security needs of the elections and strategic hot spots in light of past experiences.
1.5. In this particular case, because the candidate of the NDC lives in quite close proximity to the polling station, planning adequate security guarantees cannot be overemphasized. Adequate prior coordination has the further advantage of allowing the EC as the primary stakeholder in the electoral exercise to play a lead role in the management of security deployments for the day in order to ensure that the execution of any security agenda balances the need for security with the avoidance of a state of fear and panic created in the voting public often caused by the massive show of force.
1.6. The Commission further finds that the SWAT team which was deployed to the electoral grounds of the La Bawaleshie School Polling station grounds in complete disregard of the officially laid down electoral security arrangement were officers of the national security establishment.
1.7. In this regard, the Commission finds that these persons were deployed and commanded by a police officer names DSP Samuel Azugu under the authority of the director of operations of the national security secretariat and with the ultimate responsibility of the Minister of state for national security.
1.8. The Commission further finds that these ‘men’ were deployed to follow-up on intelligence to the effect that certain arms and ammunition stored in a warehouse within the constituency and to intercept and retrieve same. From the generality of the evidence given before the Commission, however, it is clear that the said intelligence gathered was neither shared with the police who were in charge of security for the election nor was the said intelligence information tested in accordance with any known or standardized rating/ranking protocols to determine its reliability. This is further compounded by the copious evidence before the Commission to the effect that the team aborted the mission and made no effort to retrieve the said arms.
1.9. The Commission, therefore, finds that the intelligence which formed the basis for the deployment of the armed men from national security was at best of unreliable quality.The fact that the said intelligence was not shared with lead state agencies like the police and defence intelligence is a major failure that undermined coordination. In a hotly contested political space, the manner in which the intelligence was acted upon through the counter-measure employed undermines the credibility of the report and the overall mission of the armed masked men deployed from the national security outfit.
1.10. At the time the intelligence was received and the operation planned, there was sufficient time to secure a search warrant whose issuance would have ensured that the operation was conducted in accordance with the law. In a democratic regime such as Ghana’s, the requirement of chapter 5 of the Constitution on fundamental human rights require that the subjection of the privacy of a person’s home to intrusive searches be carried out under the superintendence of law and judicial oversight, hence the need for a court order in this case.
1.11. A major complaint leading to the establishment of the Commission was the allegation of the reckless use of guns and weapons by the masked SWAT team from the national security establishment. The preponderance of evidence given in oral testimonies and video footages reviewed by the Commission shows that there were gunshots by the men deployed by the national security establishment and that these were done ostensibly to control the crowd which had formed at the frontage of the residence of the candidate of the NDC-a property which was located in an area close to the electoral grounds.
1.12. The Commission’s visit to the locus in quo and its examination of the layout, structures, and fixtures in the environment including trees impacted show, that there were many incidents of gunshots and this is inter alia marked by the signs of shallow bullet holes and impact spots created by ejected bullets as verified by a ballistic expert of the Ghana Police Service. In addition, all the bullet holes suggested that the bullets glazed off the trees as none were embedded in a tree and moved on to cause further damage.
1.13. The Commission finds that on the said day and within the context of the events on the day, several live bullets were fired and accordingly rejects the claim by officers of state who appeared before the Commission, and the commander of the SWAT team that the group only fired six warning shots.
1.14. Considering that this operation was to take place on an election day when members of the public were expected to be out and about exercising their franchise, the operation should have been conducted in a more subtle manner unless the real purpose was to be a show of force and strong-arm tactics to warn off certain persons from interfering with the election.
1.15. Further to this, the Commission finds that the warning shots fired were so done in reckless disregard for the safety of persons in the vicinity of this highly built-up area. The Commission bases its conclusion on the injuries sustained by persons on the scene in addition to the trajectory of bullets flight and impact on adjoining structures and fixtures, including a hairdressing salon in a metal container nearby. The evidence given by experts and field examination of the impact holes made by travelling bullets suggest that these bullets were fired as “warning shots”. However, as many of the witnesses testified before the Commission, the said shots were fired at the crowd.
1.16. The Commission finds that the guns were not aimed into the skies as the latter would have resulted in the bullets being ejected into the upwards before returning to earth with a spent force. The apparent reckless abandon with which the SWAT team discharged their guns as a means of crowd control which is indicative of poor training at best and intent grievously harm, at worst.
1.17. Consequently, the Commission finds that the injuries sustained, some of which are serious (including those sustained by Mr. Yaro) were the direct outcome of that reckless and callous disregard for human life. On the other hand, it bears pointing out that the video evidence and testimonies of the parties show that the rampant firing of guns by the SWAT team was the combination of two factors; Firstly a wanton show of force by the SWAT team designed to instil fear in the voting public and the crowd gathered in front of the NDC candidate’s house. Secondly, the seemingly trigger happy attitude shown ,reflects a direct failure on the part of the Commander in charge of the SWAT team, DSP Azugu, to maintain command and control of the SWAT team and ensure the upholding of the highest professional standards in the maintenance of law and order pursuant to the mission for which they were sent. The ensuing chaos was a direct result of his failure of responsibility as a commander of the group, who were meant to be on an intelligence-led mission.
1.18. Officials of the National Security Council Secretariat testified that there was firing from the crowd hence the number reciprocal of shots fired. However, there was no evidence that this was, in fact, the case. The direction of the bullet holes on the trees and metal containers also do not bear this story out.
1.19. The Commission further finds that the ammunition used were live bullets and this further heightens the belief of the Commission that the shots were calculated to cause grievous harm and injury and not to control the crowd. Further, the commission notes that the firing did not follow anyone taking refuge at the school premises. Expert testimony and eye witness accounts indicate that a number of holes on the school building were caused by an attempt to mount a signage marking the building as a donation from a group to the school.
1.20. It is therefore untrue that the said holes were made by bullets impacts on the wall caused by firing. In this regard, the Commission finds that there was no firing of guns at the polling station itself.
1.21. Further, the Commission finds that the masking of the operatives implies that the Commission is unable to identify with certainty the specific perpetrators of the offence for recommended punishment. The Commission, however, states that being the commander of the unit, DSP Azugu ought to know who those members of his team were, who may have perpetrated the impugned acts commented on and should reveal this to the police in any criminal investigation that may be opened in the future.
1.22. In this regard, the Commission further notes with deep regret the report of the attack of a uniformed police officer by operatives from the National Security Council. Evidence led before the Commission suggested a possible case of man-handling on a police officer operative from the national security against uniformed police officers who were on duty at the Prisons Compound Polling Station at Roman Ridge within the Ayawaso West Wuogon constituency.
1.23. While evidence has been led before the Commission to the contrary, the Commission finds that the use of masked men in electoral security policing represents a deviation from standard practice in Ghana. Neither the Minister for the Interior nor the Minister for National Security could provide any evidence of a single situation in which masked men armed to the teeth were used to provide security on the electoral grounds where active
Voting was ongoing under the 4th Republic. As noted, the use of armed masked men drove fear into the hearts of the voting public and was a disproportionate show of force within the context of a civil electoral exercise. The Commission will further comment on this subject subsequently in this report. The Commission also finds, there was a lack of protocol surrounding the giving out of and accountability for weapons and ammunition as well as general asset inventory-taking upon the completion of missions within the establishment of the National Security.
1.24. Despite its ability to use lethal force, the SWAT team has no instructions and procedures for the use of firearms and claims to rely on instructions of the Police Service. Yet, the Commission finds that they used civilians whom they had put in official uniform and armed with guns and Tasers (referred to as “shocker”) but who were not subject to any regime of accountability. The Minister and his team ought to explain how this force operated outside any rules of accountability in respect of the use of firearms. This became evident in the failure of the Ministry of the National Security to take stock of weapons and ammunition handed out to operatives and their use. The fact that there are contradictory testimonies on the actual number of bullets fired vis-à-vis shell casings found on the scene reflect an administrative malaise that needs urgent remedying. In the minimum, the situation implicates tracking and traceability issues and can affect any criminal investigations into the improper use of weapons issued out for official assignments. The Commission notes that the failure to manage the process of issuing weapons and ammunition to officers of the National Security remains problematic and could lead to the wrongful use of arms and ammunition belonging to the state.
1.25. Closely related to this is the absence of stringent debriefing and reporting systems within the police and national security establishments. It is clear from the preponderance of evidence presented before the Commission that there are no clear mandatory reporting and debriefing responsibilities for persons and officers from the national security who are sent on field missions. While the police have a system in place, enforcement is lax and this needs to be optimized. The Commission notes that this procedure is critical to an ex post facto assessment of the success or failure of the mission in addition to a review of any collateral fallouts of any such mission.
1.26. The Commission notes that the absence of a mandatory system could inspire serious instances of official impunity in the absence of a review mechanism to determine the effectiveness of orders carried out pursuant to missions embarked on. This can be based on the filing of an after-action review reports and not merely on oral discussions as may appear to be the norm,
1.27. Even more crucially, the Commission notes that the remit of the National Security establishment does not include active law enforcement and thus does not justify the use of arms and ammunitions per se. Consequently, as a purely intelligence-led entity whose main mandate is to gather intelligence and coordinate other agencies of state in the execution of a security strategy, the use of arms and ammunitions by the National Security not being under the aegis of the regular police and/or the military is worrisome as it suggests that the national security is a parallel entity that performs regular police work in maintaining domestic security in Ghana. In the minimum, the national security apparatus has been operated as a political appendage of succeeding governments in Ghana and has been treated as such. Their operational officers have often been changed with each change of government and their closeness with the politics of Ghana can hardly be denied. That the National Security establishment is not a regular police force nor are they part of the regular army is accordingly clear. In this regard, the Commission notes that the tendency to give the operatives of the National Security apparatus the appearance of police powers is illegal. Furthermore, the Commission denounces the tendency to put civilians in police or military uniforms to conduct offensive operations holds same illegal.
GENERAL ARCHITECTURE OF STATE SECURITY
2.1. The evidence given before the Commission presents a confused and unsettling picture relative to the structure and systems put in place for the provision of a state of national security for Ghana. In the main, the top officers whose schedules border on national security and who testified before the Commission appeared at best, unsure of the boundaries of their work and authority and the coordinating roles of their institutions relative to other allied agencies, not to speak of reforms in an evolving delicate establishment. From the totality of the evidence given, the Commission finds that the confusion may partly stem from the lack of clear demarcations of authority and responsibility as well as a delineation of mandate subsistent between the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Interior. In the sensitive aspect of national life, confusion and overlapping can only be detrimental to the interests of the state.
2.2. The evidence showed that there exist general notions of parallelism between the two key ministries mentioned and the absence of a clear strata of authority in any collaborative engagement in which the two entities are expected to cooperate. This became apparent when the Ministry of National Security decided to independently conduct the operation to intercept certain weapons following intelligence gathered to that effect. A clearer demarcation of responsibility would have meant that there should have been structured protocols on intelligence assessment, sharing and designation of which institution was to lead in the said operation as well as clear mapping out of responsibilities between the two institutions in the said operation. These, when properly managed will help deal with the command and control factors that so badly failed in the case of the SWAT operation at the Ayawaso West Wuogon Constituency.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
3.1. On the issue of command and control, the failure was even more glaring and pronounced. The Commission finds that the evidence shows a complete breakdown of command responsibility and anarchy on the electoral grounds of La Bawaleshie school polling station and the commanding officer in charge of the SWAT team could not show what interventions he made to ensure that the operation was conducted in as bet a professional manner as was possible to ensure civilian safety.
3.2. The Director of Operations at the National Security was at the operations headquarters but did not appear to have retained control, leaving matters in the hands of the tactical commander who could not defend his actions taken. The failure of command responsibility was also evident in the lack of coordination between the Sector Minister and the Minister of State in charge of National Security. The contradictory evidence presented before the Commission by the Ministers involved exemplifies the dissonance in the actions of the Ministers and Sectors involved.
3.3. The confusions in command responsibility and the lack of discretion exercised by scheduled officers on the ground on the occasion exacerbated an already degenerative situation and ultimately led to the events that were witnessed at the La Bawaleshie school polling station.
3.4. As already mentioned, the situation was worsened by factors such as the near absence of inter-agency coordination leading to the breakdown of law and order when the SWAT team showed up in the constituency without the knowledge of the police who were primarily stationed to maintain law and order at the various electoral grounds in the Constituency.
3.5. The Commission finds, rather disturbingly, that the national security establishment is a means by which party faithful’s are resettled. Whether or not these persons who perform vigilante functions are members of any known militia groups, their very presence within the state security machinery encourages opposition parties to also seek to counter their activities. Given that these persons are citizens and not ordinarily disqualified from such appointments, the Commission is particularly worried at the manner of their absorption and the absence of a system for proper training and re-socialization. The need for re-socialization is mandated by the fact that these people are ordinarily trained and used to defending political party loyalists and officers, and consequently, their training and orientation is normally partisan- a situation that disables them from operating in an establishment that should be non-partisan founded on an abject loyalty to the state.
3.6. The Commission regrets to state that it finds the contrary situation in the preponderance of evidence led before it. The current situation reflects an easy transition in which members of a party militia are ordinarily appointed as national security operatives upon the assumption of power
