Africa-Press – Mauritius. The government has introduced a bill to establish a Financial Crimes Commission (FCC) which will be the central body for investigating financial crimes (including fraud, corruption, money laundering and trafficking financing). drugs) and to prosecute suspects.
This project is the subject of an intense debate which polarizes public opinion into two opposing camps, one which suspects the government of sinister motives and the other which defends a structural reform with the declared aim of better combating financial crimes.
The moralization of the country’s financial morals is a major issue in economic governance, taking into account the fact that financial crimes are sources of illicit enrichment which have profound ramifications in society in terms of influence peddling, privileges and incestuous relationships between certain state authorities and traffickers.
Moreover, in the recent past, Mauritius was included on the gray and black lists of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the OECD and the European Union due to strategic deficiencies in the AML/CFT (Anti -Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism).
It is unfortunate that such an important structural reform cannot be the subject of a dispassionate debate. If everyone agrees that the fight against financial crimes requires a more effective regulation and control structure, it is the proposed methodology that is problematic.
Indeed, behind the general object of the bill, it is the government’s entire strategic intention that raises the eyebrows of informed observers. Since the 1990s, the country has been searching for the ideal structural formula to detect financial crimes.
The first institution known as the Economic Crime Office (ECO) was created by a Labor government, but it was dissolved in January 2002 by the MMM-MSM government.
Subsequently, he set up a new institution, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), under the Prevention of Corruption Act to replace the ECO.
However, all the hopes placed in the ICAC were frustrated due to its lack of independence, its proverbial slowness and its very poor record. The ICAC gave the impression of dealing with small fry instead of tracking down the big sharks of fraud and corruption.
The major corruption cases referred to him have remained unresolved for years. In certain cases, the ICAC has been disavowed by the courts, as in the case where a suspect (a state pharmacist) – prosecuted for alleged malpractice in the award of a medicine supply contract – was acquitted for lack of evidence.
Given the current institutional dysfunctions whereby the institutions responsible for combating financial crimes operate in isolation, and are sometimes at loggerheads with each other over their areas of expertise, a new structure is undoubtedly necessary.
The FCC is the new structure that will bring together three investigative institutions under one roof, including the ICAC, the Asset Recovery Investigation Division (ARID) of the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Integrity Reporting Services Agency (IRSA).
Like ICAC, ARID and IRSA have not produced positive results. ARID’s record, in terms of investigation into unexplained wealth, is zero to date while external signs of wealth are very visible in certain circles. From the outset, it appears that there is a credibility problem for the FCC.
Although section 4 of the bill says that the FCC will not, in the exercise of its functions and powers, be under the direction of any person or authority, the conditions of its independence do not do not seem to be united.
Indeed, Article 10 provides that the Director General of the FCC will be appointed by the Prime Minister on a contractual basis for five years after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
In practice, we know what consultation means. The PM informs the Leader of the Opposition of his choice. He can express his disagreement but he does not have a right of veto.
As in many cases, a head of service appointed by the PM is only accountable to the head of government. He is not accountable to the tax-paying public or to Parliament.
Ideally, the director general of the FCC should be appointed by consensus by the three personalities of the State (the President of the Republic, the PM and the leader of the Opposition) or by an independent body such as the Judicial and Legal Services Commission by drawing the rare bird from the ranks of the judiciary.
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