Africa-Press – South-Sudan. By Zechariah Makuach Maror
Following a 2005 peace agreement that ended Africa’s longest-running civil war, South Sudan declared independence from Sudan in July 2011. In January 2011, an overwhelming majority of South Sudanese voted to secede and become Africa’s first new country to attain independence through a referendum after 18 years. South Sudan’s ambition of becoming more African and acquisition for broader recognition hasn’t ended with the flying of the flags; the country submitted a slew of applications to regional and international agencies to review its status as a sovereign state. The East African community was one of the inter-governmental organisations South Sudan’s application faced a setback before admission due to the institution’s fragility.
Political instability, weak governance, and corruption impeded development in the world’s youngest country one year after independence. Most settlements in South Sudan lack electricity or running water, and the country’s general infrastructure is poor, with barely 10,000 kilometres (6,200 miles) of paved highways. The country has inadequate telecommunications services though lacking the infrastructure to provide high-speed Internet access, poor human development record and rampant insecurity. The East African Community denied South Sudan’s application to join the blocs for reasons not limited to the above.
Denied with glimpse of hope for future membership, at the 14th Ordinary Summit in Nairobi in 2012, the EAC heads of state approved the verification report submitted by the bloc’s Council of Ministers and subsequently authorised the EAC Council of Ministers to commence negotiations with South Sudan, which resulted in full membership four years later. The procedure, which had started following the EAC Council of Ministers meeting in August 2013, took at least four years to finish. South Sudan’s worst level of the institutional abyss—ravaged by conflict over power struggles, economic collapse, and a complete breakdown of human development, coincided with the East African Community’s decision to fully admit the country into the bloc in 2016 as if there were no entrance adherence standards.
Despite the impulsive rush for South Sudan to join the EAC, many South Sudanese intellectuals expressed opposition to the idea. In 2011, an incognito South Sudanese Member of Parliament was quoted casting doubt on the government’s decision to eagerly rush for the East African Community, saying the crippled economy that is not developed enough to compete with partner states, would turn South Sudan into a “dumping ground” for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan exports. He was correct; given the bloc’s goal of broadening and deepening economic, political, social, and cultural integration based on competitiveness, value-added production, trade, and investments, South Sudan is a potential loser in this cut-throat market.
with “alarum” diplomatic efforts by the South Sudan government to join the EAC, and with lacerate approval of South Sudan’s membership by the council, the country’s failure to comply with the bloc’s obligations and duties has disenchanted the partners; failures ranging from insolvency to clear its accumulative arrears totalling more than $27 million, provision of security to none South Sudanese east African citizens subsisting on its soil, and failure to force-effects some judicial verdicts of the East African Court of Justice, the bloc’s jurist wings. All substantiated the excuses of some South Sudanese and bloc’s partners who erstwhile cast doubt on South Sudan’s admission to the bloc.
It is important to note that East Africa is the home to many South Sudanese before and after the membership, East African countries hosted more than 1.5 million South Sudan nationals, the majority are refugees who rely on humanitarian aid from non-governmental organizations (Uganda and Kenya are home to the majority). They have limited access to land, capital, and skill to defect to the market potential, contrary to the citizens of those respective countries living in South Sudan for business purposes.
According to United Nation Development Program (UNDP), South Sudan’s Human Development Index for 2019 is 0.433, placing it 185th out of 189 countries and territories and spotting it in the poor human development category in the world. Uganda ranked 159th out of 189 countries and territories in the 2019 Human Development Index, with a score of 0.544. Kenya’s HDI value for 2019 is 0.601, placing it 143rd out of 189 countries and territories and placing it in the medium human development category. In comparison to Uganda and Kenya, South Sudan has the lowest index measure on three major dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to information, and a good standard of living, all of which are critical for a competitive market. The assessment depicts that the country is too young to sit at the same table with the bloc’s most powerful economies and expect to be satisfied.
South Sudan doesn’t have the social, economic and political muscle to compete in East Africa’s free trade zone given its poor socio-economic development. South Sudan ranked 161 in total exports ($850 million) in 2020, according to the publicly available data from the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), and does not have more data on the Economic Complexity Index. Uganda was ranked 99 in the Economic Complexity Index (ECI -0.97) and 108 in total exports ($5.87 billion) in the same year. Kenya was ranked 80 in the Economic Complexity Index (ECI -0.47) and 103 in total exports ($6.52 billion) in the same year. South Sudan ranked 161 in total exports ($850 million) in the same year and does not have data on the Economic Complexity Index.
According to Economic Complexity Index, Uganda’s exports to South Sudan have climbed at a 46 per cent annualised pace over eight years, from $17.3 million in 2012 to $357 million in 2020. South Sudan’s exports to Uganda grew at a 220 per cent yearly pace during the same period, from $7.79 million in 2012 to $86.7 million in 2020. Kenyan exports to South Sudan have climbed at an average rate of 4.5 per cent over five years, from $173 million in 2015 to $216 million in 2020. During the same period, South Sudanese exports to Kenya climbed by 34.9 per cent annually, from $88.7k in 2015 to $396k in 2020. According to the figures above, Uganda and Kenya are more than three poles ahead of South Sudan in terms of interim trade. The data are ascertaining that South Sudan is a dumping ground for Uganda and Kenyan goods.
The East Africa Monetary Union (EAMU), a transitional mechanism to the East Africa supra-Bank aiming at issuing the single currency expected to be in effect by 2024, is already underway in support of the plans to put the East into a single monetary market. The outlay is expected to mince the national currencies of weak economies and make the market more unified and competitive. The Council directed the Partner State that will host the EAMU institution to cover office rent, office equipment, utilities, and other support for the first two years, as stipulated in the East African Monetary Union Protocol.
Already, a struggle has erupted over whom to host the riches institution, with three bidders vying for the honour: Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. South Sudan’s bid prospects are already hampered by the requirement that no non-shareholders in the East African Development Bank (EADB) be allowed and that if necessary, members of the EADB be legally admitted by purchasing shares. At the time, the bank’s shareholders are the Republics of Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Burundi and South Sudan are not members of the East Africa Development Bank.
Because Uganda hosts three Community institutions: the East African Development Bank (EADB), which is charged with promoting sustainable socio-economic development in East Africa by providing development finance, support, and advisory services; and the Civil Aviation Safety (CAS) and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA). Tanzania is the temporary home of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), the Community’s legislative organ, and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the Community’s judicial organ, the East African Kiswahili Commission (EAKC). With Kenya holding the only rotating presidency, it appears that Kenya would be the favoured bidder to win hosting monetary institutions based on the policy of equitable mutual benefit allocation among members. If South Sudan was economically viable, it would have processed its membership in EADB, thus vying for hosting of the EAMU, due to that impediment South Sudan’s membership in the regional body remain half-baked, flimsy and symbolic.
If South Sudan contends to embrace East African monetary unions, the contradiction between aggregate economic efficiency benefits and distributional repercussions could aptly be resolved. Because of the inherent tendency for divergence, the politics inside the EAC must be just perfect for the EAMU to completely take off uniformly and benefit the Partner States, regardless of who is economically strong or weak. South Sudan on its own must focus on adopting and implementing the convergence criteria that can support South Sudan’s economic management through the external imposition of monetary discipline if it wants to join the EAMU or fully benefit from EAC membership.
Given South Sudan’s weak statehood, the EAC should develop a mechanism to strengthen South Sudan’s institutions so that they can effectively perform core institutional functions such as fostering equitable and sustainable economic growth, governing legitimately, ensuring physical security, and delivering basic services. On the other hand, for the bloc to avoid finance fickle of weak states, they must move quickly to implement the Sectoral Council on Finance and Economic Affairs’ latest Hybrid Model of Financing Budget Policy, which will promote equity, solidarity, and equality; a big economy must pay big and benefit big!
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