By Mona Abdel Fattah
Africa-Press – South-Sudan. Recently, Khartoum and Juba have been moving at a rapid diplomatic and security pace, driven by the nature of the current phase and the new realities brought about by the war in Sudan along the borders and shared interests. In a short period, communications and visits between officials from both countries have increased, from Khartoum to Juba, in an effort to reactivate dialogue channels regarding a number of files that have remained unresolved or prone to tension, primarily security and military issues, border security, the oil-rich Abyei file, and the network of economic interests that emerged between the two countries since the separation.
The visit of the South Sudanese President’s Advisor for Security Affairs, Tut Kewak, to Khartoum in late July carried a message from President Salva Kiir Mayardit to the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, inviting him to visit Juba, opening a new path for high-level communications. Just days later, the momentum shifted to Juba with the arrival of two Sudanese delegations, one headed by Defense Minister General Hassan Kbrun and the other by the Governor of Darfur, Mini Arko Minawi, reflecting the widening scope of issues requiring consultation between the two sides, intertwining their security, political, and economic dimensions.
These movements come at a time when the relationship between Khartoum and Juba is no longer merely a bilateral matter; the war in Sudan has reshaped the security environment along the borders and heightened the sensitivity of population movement, trade, and arms, while oil remains one of the most entrenched links of mutual dependence between the two countries. Abyei, with its political, security, and social complexities, continues to be a persistent test of the two sides’ ability to manage the issues left unresolved by the separation. Thus, the recent visits gain importance as attempts to consult on resolving these files and managing intertwined interests, rather than merely being protocol communications between neighboring states.
Negotiation Legacy
Both countries inherited a heavy negotiation legacy following South Sudan’s separation in 2011, left by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, and began building a new framework to manage the remaining issues from the separation. On March 13, 2012, the two parties signed an agreement regarding border demarcation and simultaneously framed an agreement on the status of citizens of each country in the other, including the principle of “four freedoms.” However, the escalation of border confrontations and the war over oil pushed the entire file to the Security Council, which issued Resolution 2046 on May 2, 2012, calling for the resumption of negotiations regarding oil, borders, the status of citizens, and the final status of Abyei.
A turning point came on September 27, 2012, when former President Omar al-Bashir and President Salva Kiir signed a “Cooperation Agreement” in Addis Ababa, along with a package of eight complementary agreements addressing security arrangements, oil, transitional financial arrangements, the status of citizens, post-service benefits, trade, banking, borders, and some economic issues. Thus, the majority of the contractual framework that was supposed to shift the relationship from the logic of sharing the legacy of a single state to the logic of mutual interests between two independent states was achieved.
However, the signing was not the end of negotiations; it marked the beginning of the toughest test: implementation. The application of security arrangements remained stalled over some details, particularly in the “Mile 14” area, until March 2013, when mechanisms for implementation and timelines for troop withdrawal and the establishment of a joint verification and monitoring mechanism were reached.
The major settlement knot remained outside the package: the final status of Abyei and the disputed border areas. These are not merely items awaiting signature but issues that touch on the definition of borders themselves and the interests of the population and resources. Therefore, the 2012 agreement remains a framework for cooperation, while the most sensitive issues remain suspended between negotiation, mediation, and field realities.
Thus lies the paradox of the relationship; the two sides managed to agree on arrangements for oil, security, trade, and economic interests, which are highly complex files, yet they failed to close the two files directly related to geography and sovereignty.
Prioritization of Calculations
If the past years kept the outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan within the circle of postponed negotiations, recent developments have brought some of them back to the forefront of political and security calculations. This includes Abyei and the disputed border areas, which still represent the most sensitive part of the relationship, as the dispute is no longer related to a line on the map but rather to the population, grazing routes, movement, resources, and local power arrangements. The file has gained more urgency with the inclusion of Abyei’s administration in the electoral circles for the upcoming South Sudan elections scheduled for December 22 of this year, which Khartoum rejected as a unilateral action that contradicts the special arrangements for the area.
Conversely, the meetings of the Joint Political and Security Committee in Juba have indicated a more practical approach, as both sides have moved to neutralize Abyei from steps of fait accompli, activate temporary arrangements, and prevent any unilateral changes in its status, alongside enhancing coordination to prevent armed groups from crossing and securing borders, oil facilities, and crude transport lines. The importance of these understandings lies in their restoration of security to its natural position as a prerequisite for political settlement.
Regarding the borders, the file has advanced a step further, as both sides announced in February that they agreed to directly begin demarcation, noting a consensus of about 90 percent of the areas, with disputed points remaining outside the final settlement. This theoretically allows for the separation of the technical demarcation process from the more complex political issues.
In the debt file, the settlement remains primarily linked to Sudan’s debt relief process under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, with Khartoum entering discussions with the International Monetary Fund in July regarding a roadmap to complete this process. Meanwhile, South Sudan faces a different debt structure, amounting to approximately $3.5 billion by the end of the 2025 fiscal year, with a significant portion of commercial debt relying on oil guarantees.
The current outcome is not a comprehensive settlement but a calculated transition from managing files through statements and positions to testing implementation mechanisms, securing borders, preventing escalation in Abyei, protecting oil interests, and rebuilding a degree of trust that allows unresolved issues to remain negotiable.
Deep Challenges
Khartoum and Juba face a dilemma that goes beyond the difficulty of reaching consensual texts; the deeper obstacle is the absence of a political and security environment that makes agreements viable. The Sudanese war is at the forefront of these constraints, having reshaped the borders as a space for the movement of arms, armed groups, and displaced persons, and weakened the joint monitoring mechanisms that were a safety valve for the region. The suspension of the field presence of the border verification and monitoring mechanism has undermined one of the most important practical guarantees for security arrangements.
Abyei remains the toughest test, as it encapsulates in one area the question of sovereignty with the interests of the population, the movement of herders with resources, local politics with national calculations. The danger here is that temporary measures could turn into permanent realities, military presence, unilateral management, or electoral arrangements read as attempts to change the legal status of the area. Therefore, the inclusion of Abyei in the electoral circles of South Sudan adds a new political dilemma to a dispute that has not been resolved fundamentally.
As for the borders, the problem is not just in drawing the line but in managing the area on either side. Populations move, cattle cross, and markets extend across the borders, while the balance of power shifts faster than official institutions can keep up. The proliferation of arms and the informal economy exacerbates this dilemma, making any technical progress in demarcation susceptible to reversal if not accompanied by an effective system for crossings, trade, grazing, and local security.
Then comes oil as both a link of mutual dependence and a source of tension simultaneously. South Sudan needs Sudanese infrastructure, and Sudan needs the revenues and fees associated with oil transit, but the war has proven that energy facilities can quickly become military targets.
Trust remains the common denominator among all these files; each side views the other’s concession as a potential strategic loss. Therefore, a realistic settlement will not begin with resolving all issues at once but by building a series of interests that can be protected: border security, continued oil flow, freedom of movement, and preventing unilateral actions.
Possible Scenarios
Although envisioning a comprehensive settlement of the outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan seems difficult in the near term, the more likely path is a gradual settlement that begins with managing the dispute before resolving it. This is reinforced by the fact that the war in Sudan continues to directly pressure border security and Abyei, while Juba enters a sensitive political phase with its upcoming elections, making any unilateral step in Abyei likely to escalate into a crisis between the two countries.
The first scenario, negotiation containment, is the most probable. Recent security understandings may succeed in transforming the borders from a space of apprehension into a field for confidence-building measures by regulating the movement of fighters, securing oil, activating joint mechanisms, and maintaining the status quo in Abyei. In this case, sovereignty over Abyei will not be resolved quickly, but it will be neutralized from escalation, while border demarcation progresses in the less contentious sectors. This, in the calculations of realistic politics, could be a greater achievement than a final agreement that neither side has the tools to implement.
The second scenario is a long-term freeze. The two sides may reach security and economic understandings but struggle to move beyond Abyei and the disputed areas. The United Nations remains present, and negotiation mechanisms continue, while the temporary situation gradually transforms into a quasi-permanent reality. This scenario is likely if the war in Sudan continues and internal instability persists in South Sudan.
The third scenario is a security setback. The southern elections, continued influx of fighters and arms across the borders, or a significant incident in Abyei could lead to a resurgence of mutual accusations. At that point, issues of oil, borders, and Abyei become intertwined in a single crisis, diminishing negotiation opportunities. The likelihood of this increases if internal pressures in either country coincide with the elite’s desire to use border issues to rally domestic support.
The fourth scenario, the most ambitious and least likely in the short term, is a major phased settlement, agreeing on permanent security arrangements, joint management of Abyei, tangible progress in border demarcation, and mutual guarantees for the continuity of oil and trade movement. This path may not begin with Abyei itself but with less politically costly interests; once economic and security cooperation becomes regular, the calculations of both sides regarding sovereign files can change.
