Africa-Press – Zambia. The Patriotic Front is no longer merely divided. It is convulsing. What is unfolding within the party ahead of the 2026 general election increasingly resembles an internal earthquake, with multiple fault lines running through its leadership and base. The latest flashpoint is the explosive audio involving Dr Chishimba Kambwili and a supporter aligned to Brian Mundubile’s camp, but this episode is less a scandal in isolation than a symptom of a deeper structural crisis.
At the centre of this tension is a cold war between three power centres. The Given Lubinda bloc, which currently controls party machinery. The Brian Mundubile camp, which believes it has the numbers and momentum to win a convention if one is held credibly. And the Makebi Zulu tendency, which operates as both legal shield and political shock absorber for the former ruling elite. Overlaying this is Chishimba Kambwili, a volatile actor whose interventions often destabilise rather than consolidate.
Kambwili’s latest outburst, in which he publicly accused Mundubile of corruption and predicted his arrest, has drawn condemnation even from within opposition circles. Simon Mulenga Mwila, an aspiring Lusaka mayor, described the conduct as “political cannibalism” and urged Mundubile to seek legal redress for criminal libel and defamation.
Mwila’s intervention captures a growing sentiment that opposition leaders are now expending more energy on mutual destruction than on articulating a credible alternative to government.
This matters because PF’s internal fights are no longer contained. They are public, vicious, and repetitive. Leadership disputes that should be resolved through institutional processes are instead playing out through audio leaks, social media accusations, and factional briefings. The result is a party that appears incapable of discipline, coherence, or message control.
The timing is also politically costly. With less than a year to the 2026 elections, PF is yet to hold a convention, yet multiple figures are already campaigning as if nominations are imminent. Lubinda and his allies argue that legal constraints and injunctions justify delays.
Mundubile’s camp increasingly believes those delays are tactical, designed to block his path to the presidency. Makebi Zulu has openly spoken of contingency plans and alternative “vehicles,” implicitly conceding the depth of institutional uncertainty within PF.
Meanwhile, the party’s organisational weakness is becoming visible on the ground. In Kasama Central, PF MP Sibongile Mwamba has openly endorsed a UPND mayoral candidate. In Mufulira, Kantanshi MP Anthony Mumba bluntly declared that PF “only exists on social media,” arguing that its structures have collapsed and that it no longer functions as a serious opposition force.
These are not remarks from political opponents alone. They reflect what voters are observing in real time.
The financial dimension compounds the problem. Given Lubinda has publicly complained that he is funding campaigns from his own pocket, including costly by-elections such as Chawama. He accused vocal party members of promising large contributions but delivering nothing. This is not just about money. It signals institutional decay.
A party that once commanded state resources now struggles to finance basic electoral participation, while its leaders trade accusations instead of pooling capacity.
Perhaps most damaging is the generational impact. As Simon Mulenga Mwila noted, this conduct is repulsive to the youth. Young voters are not mobilised by vendettas, threats, or leaked audios. They are looking for ideas, jobs, stability, and credible leadership. An opposition whose loudest voice is accusation rather than policy risks exhausting, rather than inspiring, the electorate.
Historically, opposition victories in Zambia have depended on unity, discipline, and moral clarity. The MMD in 1991 and UPND in 2021 both benefited from broad coalitions and a sense of inevitability built on organisation. PF today shows the opposite traits i.e. fragmentation, suspicion, ego-driven politics, and the absence of an agreed process for leadership succession.
The danger for PF is not simply losing 2026. It is becoming irrelevant before voters even reach the ballot. Internal implosion does not need electoral defeat to do its damage. It alienates supporters, confuses sympathisers, and hands strategic advantage to the ruling party without a contest.
Unless PF arrests this slide, restores internal discipline, holds a credible convention, and re-centres its politics on policy rather than personalities, the party risks confirming what its critics already argue. The opposition’s biggest obstacle is not Hichilema or the state, but itself.
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