writes Abubakar Usman Abubakar
Africa-Press – Angola. Wide ranging tariffs on a range of industries will cause short-term pain and may cause economic realignment.
From dismissive remarks about “sh*thole countries” to mocking Lesotho as a place “nobody has ever heard of” before slapping the tiny country with a 50 per cent tariff, US President Donald Trump’s engagement with Africa is often marked by disdain rather than diplomacy. His administration’s policies include sweeping travel bans on several African nations and threats of mass deportations of undocumented migrants, many of whom are African citizens have further strained ties with the continent. Coupled with his “America First” agenda, aggressive trade tariffs, and deep cuts to foreign aid, Trump’s tenure will leave US-Africa relations at one of their lowest points in decades.
Yet, the economic relationship between the US and Africa has historically been significant. Since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has allowed eligible sub-Saharan African nations to export thousands of goods to the US duty-free. Additionally, five of the top ten recipients of USAID are African nations, including powerhouses like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The continent benefits significantly from both American aid and trade.
Tariffs and USAID’s demise
US trade preferences are now under threat due to growing protectionism under the Trump administration. Although AGOA has not been officially repealed, the imposition of a 10 per cent base tariff casts serious doubt on its future. In 2023, Africa exported over £6.88 billion worth of goods to the US. A significant drop in this volume would deal a serious blow to African economies.
Trump has invoked Section 232 of the US Trade Expansion Act, granting the president power to adjust imports of steel and aluminium products on national security grounds. While China remains the main target, African countries like South Africa, which is a major steel and aluminium exporter to the US stand to suffer significant losses from these measures.
USAID’s food aid will continue, but most operations are suspended and at risk of permanent termination. The discontinuation of the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), is projected to result in up to 500,000 deaths in South Africa alone over the next decade.
USAID’s agricultural programs, crucial for market development, capacity building, and sustainable farming, are also at risk. Their withdrawal would severely undermine food security and rural livelihoods across the continent.
A trade and aid vacuum
The fate of nations such as Sudan, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is now at greater risk, given their extreme vulnerability. The emerging aid and trade vacuum will disproportionately affect these fragile states, where ongoing instability and humanitarian crises make external support essential.
According to Statista, US foreign direct investment flows to Africa reached £42 billion in 2023. The newly imposed tariffs are likely to deter not only direct investment but also foreign portfolio investment and remittance flows. These financial streams are closely tied to access to the U.S. market. Without it, many African economies may face deeper economic strain.
Africa’s Shift to China, Russia, and beyond
Since the early 2000s, China has become Africa’s largest trading partner and infrastructure investor. It committed over £53.894 billion between 2014 and 2024. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has financed projects like the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway and Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway.
China has also built more than 12,000 km of roads, developed over 20 ports, and constructed 80+ power facilities, reshaping Africa’s economic landscape. In mining, Chinese firms hold key positions in Botswana and the DRC, gaining access to strategic minerals.
China is now Africa’s leading bilateral lender, with loans exceeding £68 billion by 2022. Countries like Zambia and Angola, hit by declining Western trade, increasingly rely on opaque Chinese financing. Western critics warn of “debt-trap diplomacy,” though Beijing denies these claims. Despite the threat, with the US becoming an increasingly unreliable partner, it is highly unlikely that these nations have much concern over their continued reliance on China’s funding.
China’s growing influence is evident in its diplomatic engagement. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 36 heads of state attended in 2024. Although 49 heads of state who participated in the 2022 US-Africa summit. Although not all African heads of state attended the most recent FOCAC, virtually all African nations were well represented. Such high-level attendance reflects African countries’ recognition of China as a serious economic partner on the continent.
Likewise, the US’s lacklustre security relationship with Africa has created openings for Russia. Through the Wagner Group and official partnerships, Moscow has increased its military footprint in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Mozambique.
Following the 2024 US military exits from Chad and Niger, Russia’s influence in Africa is expanding. It offers military support without democratic preconditions, appealing to authoritarian regimes and reshaping the continent’s security alliances. Both Chad and Niger ordered US troops to leave their territories at the start of 2024. Niger later awarded the same military base vacated by the US to Russian forces. However, Chad eventually reversed its decision and announced the return of US special forces later in the year.
Middle Eastern states have also moved into the vacuum. In 2024, it was reported that the UAE surpassed China as Africa’s biggest source of foreign direct investment, focusing on ports and energy. Turkey has grown its commercial presence as well.
Meanwhile, the EU’s trade share with Africa has steadily been rising reaching an all-time high of more than €55 billion in 2022. It is another demonstration of African countries juggling a growing list of external partners, balancing opportunity and competition.
Resistance and Realignment
The US has slid to third among Africa’s top trading partners, behind China and India. Trump’s tariffs are set to further erode AGOA, with 10 per cent base tariffs imposed on 29 African nations, while countries like South Africa, Angola, and Botswana face rates exceeding 30 per cent.
The instability of US trade policy reinforces the importance of African integration. The African Continental Free Trade Area, launched in 2019, aims to boost intra-African trade from 18 per cent to 50 per cent by 2035. Trump’s return adds urgency to this vision.
Another likely response from African countries is a deeper pivot toward China. Afrobarometer data (2024) reveals that 60 per cent of Africans view China’s influence positively, compared to just 50 per cent for the US. Warnings from Washington about Chinese “debt traps” have failed to shift public sentiment.
Trump’s tariffs and aid cuts may deepen this perception gap. As Africa experiences the fallout of U.S. policy shifts, the continent’s leaders are increasingly likely to question America’s reliability—and the wisdom of ignoring alternatives.
The current US policy shift offers Africa a hard but timely lesson in geopolitical realism. Three strategic imperatives have emerged as a result: shift from aid dependency to competitive trade, reduce external reliance through continental integration, and become more assertive in negotiating global partnerships.
Short-term disruptions may yield long-term benefits. The abrupt erosion of US goodwill reveals the fragility of one-sided partnerships. It should galvanize efforts to implement AfCFTA, promote industrialisation, and build resilient value chains.
With no one certain what Trump’s next move will be once the 90-day tariff pause expires, this crisis presents an opportunity for Africa to emerge stronger, less dependent, and more diversified. US inconsistency has, perhaps inadvertently, helped Africa clarify its path forward toward a self-determined and strategically autonomous future.
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