By
Amina Munir
Africa-Press – Mauritius. Geopolitics considered landmass to be destiny for centuries. Empires grew by dominating space; great powers gauged power in boundaries, people, and industrialization. Nonetheless, there is a change in the geometry of power. The power of the Indian Ocean, however, is no longer directly based on the size of a state, but rather on its location, particularly at chokepoints, shipping routes, and the infrastructure that keeps armies and markets moving. This is why small islands and micro-territories, some of which are sovereign, some of which are leased, some of which are disputed, are no longer peripheral. They are emerging strategic platforms in a broader security and logistics system: surveillance platforms, fuelling platforms, air operations platforms, submarine cable protection platforms, and crisis response platforms.
In the age of presence and persistence, islands play the role of fixed aircraft carriers – more difficult to move than a vessel, more useful than they appear on a map. Three examples can be given of how this island-centric order is taking shape: Diego Garcia (strategic permanence), Djibouti (strategic density), and the Maldives (strategic influence through economics). A fourth (Seychelles) Assumption Island points to the political boundaries of militarization in the small states.
Diego Garcia: Sovereignty Can Move; Strategic Access Often Doesn’t
There can be no symbol of the new logic like Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago- one of the most decisive of all small places on the planet. In the UK-Mauritius agreement of 2025, Mauritius is acknowledged as having sovereignty over the Chagos, whilst giving the UK permission to maintain control and use of Diego Garcia under a long-term agreement safeguarding the operations of the US base there.
This is the geopolitical paradox of the decade: official sovereignty and informal control may be disordered. The utility of the island geographically, which is a projection of power, long-range missions, and continuity in the greater Indo-Pacific, makes it much more than a legal issue. Actually, the UK analysis of parliament compounds the deal as a means of fixing an old dispute over sovereignty, at the same time assuring the survival of the base. (UK Parliament briefing, Sept 2025)
According to recent reporting, the controversy is understandable, as displaced Chagossians are still confronting the results that may not favor their right to return, and the base is still the main focus of USUK strategic thought. Meanwhile, according to Reuters, there are financial terms of the agreement that are to continue, and the US-UK leaders reaffirm the strategic relevance of the base in public.
The morale of contemporary maritime strategy, access provisions, basing rights, and infrastructure continuity might be of greater importance than flags. Territory can be bargained, but logistics hardly ever.
Djibouti: When the World’s Armies Stack Up in One Small State
Djibouti is the image of density, when Diego Garcia is the image of permanence. Few nations illustrate the idea of how small geography may turn into a world security center better. Djibouti is a strategic location, situated close to the Bab el-Mandeb, which is one of the busiest maritime junctions in the entire world. Djibouti is now home to various foreign military bases (primarily of the United States and China, but also France, Japan, and others) supporting various missions such as counterterrorism, intelligence, maritime security, and evacuation missions.
However, it is not merely a military one–it is economic politics. Another role played by hosting bases is that of a state revenue strategy. Various estimates put the amount of income associated with the bases at up to hundreds of millions of dollars a year, creating a major portion of national revenue. There is a strategic risk with strategic density. The risk of miscalculation increases when competitors are in proximity, not necessarily intentionally, but through friction: airspace accidents, intelligence differences, misinterpretation of signals, or increased crisis in the adjacent water.
The dilemma of Djibouti is structural: on the one hand, the country is a goldmine because of its geography; on the other hand, it is a potential hotbed in the event of the intensification of a great-power confrontation.
The Maldives: Influence Without Bases
The third way is demonstrated by the Maldives: not necessarily the case of overt basing, but economic orientation that forms strategic space. The fact that the Maldives occupies key sea routes that connect the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the route approaches to the Gulf of Aden makes its alliances significant. China has also sought significant infrastructure projects in the Maldives, such as the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, which has often been cited as one of the flagship Belt and Road-connected projects. The Maldives investments in China are covered in the facts section (CFR overview of China’s Maldives investments)
No less important: trade architecture. Authoritative Chinese government documents and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce indicate that the China-Maldives Free Trade Agreement became effective on January 1, 2025, a significant change compared to the past years when the agreement was under discussion and not implemented at all. (Gov.cn announcement) ; (MOFCOM statement) India, on its part, has gone ahead to strengthen its relationship via finance and diplomacy, with India reporting new financial assistance and the introduction of official free trade negotiations between India and the Maldives as the relationship develops in the context of regional rivalry.
The strategic implication would be that even with no apparent militarization, islands can be made a platform of power projection. In other cases, strategic gravity is the result of supply chains, debt exposure, trade regulations, ports, airports, and digital infrastructure that can affect the outcome of security.
Assumption Island: Domestic Politics and Sovereignty Anxiety
The case of Assumption Island (Seychelles) is taken as an example that even a small territory can turn into a security resource. However, a closer interpretation is the fact that it demonstrates the extent to which militarization becomes disputed in small states. In 2018, a Reuters story reported a 20-year agreement on infrastructure related to the use of Indian naval. However various reports also reveal that the project had its own domestic opposition and political difficulties with reports stating that Seychelles at one time sent signals that it was not going to go ahead in the form that it had initially envisaged.
That is why the right analytical conclusion is not Assumption proves microstates are militarizing.
It is sharper than that:
Micro-territories are good, so good that their home politics and their anxieties around sovereignty and their popular legitimacy are determinable factors. Smaller states are not chess boards only, but can veto, delay, renegotiate or charge admission.
From Big Bases to Networked Maritime Infrastructure
Collectively, these instances indicate a clear direction: the competition of the Indian Ocean is shifting towards a world of not only several huge installations, but also distributed networks – a kind of a maritime nervous system of nodes that allows:
Fast establishment and long-term operation.
Refuelling, logistics, maintenance.
Coverage of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).
Chokepoint surveillance and maritime domain awareness.
Evacuation routes and crisis reaction.
It is not just a matter of occupying territory. It is concerned with the continuity in a volatile domain. The ships come around; treaties lapse; freeing governments. But islands when tied up in long-term infrastructure and reach provide what the most desired thing in a strategist is permanence.
The Risks: Militarization, Legal Friction, and Small-State Coercion
There are also threats to this order focused on this island that the policy elites usually downplay:
Where war groups are functioning in close proximity, there are higher chances of incidents occurring- even without war objectives.
The example of Chagos/Diego Garcia also shows that even the politically and ethically strategic resolution of sovereignty arrangements can be contested.
When micro states are dependent on outside funds, trade, or security assurances, they might be coerced in time of crisis, when their national interest is to balance.
When one of the key powers develops their posture on a few nodes, these nodes will be very lured targets- politically, legally, or militarily.
The Smallest Places Cast the Longest Shadows
Indian Ocean is no longer a transit space. It is a contentious strategic architecture in which energy circulation, undersea cables, shipping insurance rates, drone ranges and alliance structures clash. That system does not have islands and micro-territories as footnotes. They are leverage. The following strategic surprise cannot be expected to come out of the capital of a superpower. It can be based upon an atoll which is not on the map of most people where a lease is renegotiated, a runway is extended, a port is modernized or a domestic protest has caused a basing plan to crash. Geography is also becoming currency again in the age of networked competition, but nowadays the best geography is geography which is the smallest in size.
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