Mariga Masri, a researcher from Mali
Mali is currently experiencing a fuel crisis that has impacted daily life, yet the situation is not as dire as portrayed in some media reports. While there are challenges, including fuel shortages and school closures, life in the capital, Bamako, continues with markets open and essential goods available.
Mali is currently facing a noticeable fuel shortage that has affected the functioning of some public services. Schools across the republic have been suspended, and some transportation services have been temporarily halted. However, despite these difficulties, life has not come to a standstill. Markets remain open, essential goods are available, and there has not yet been a food crisis as some have suggested. In the capital, Bamako, life continues largely as normal. Markets are still operational, goods are available, and there has been no significant increase in prices.
Even areas close to the capital, such as Koulikoro, Kay, and Sikasso, are experiencing normal activity despite the slow movement of trucks coming from Senegal and Ivory Coast.
The Malian army remains stationed in strategic locations, and security forces continue their operations. The routes previously used for transporting fuel and goods have now come under a new system of monitoring and distribution. These measures, although they have slowed truck movements, are a necessary step to regulate fuel passage and prevent smuggling to armed groups.
The deep-rooted causes of the crisis are often overlooked by many observers. What is happening in Mali today is not merely a fuel crisis or supply shortage; it is the result of deeper field transformations. For about a year, we have observed that terrorist groups, which were concentrated in central Mali (in areas like Mopti, Bandiagara, Koro, Bankass, and some regions in Segou), have begun to gradually move southward, towards the region closer to the capital.
This movement is not random; it is a calculated tactic aimed at dispersing the Malian army (FAMA), which had concentrated its presence in the north and center to confront the armed rebellion there.
At the same time, there have been indications of movements by the “FLA” rebel forces, which were stationed in border areas between Mali and Algeria. What is new is that these forces have begun to infiltrate central areas, paralleling the movements of terrorist groups, suggesting some form of unannounced understanding or coordination between the two sides. The apparent goal is to create multi-directional pressure on the Malian army, forcing it to distribute its forces over wide areas of the country, thereby weakening its ability to maintain tight control in any specific area.
If this assessment is correct, then what is happening in Mali today is not an “security collapse,” as some promote, but a repositioning of armed groups. They are now attempting to consolidate their strength and temporarily expand their reach while they reorganize for attacks in their traditional northern territories.
This is not the first time these groups have resorted to such tactics; they did the same years ago when they retreated before the army, only to return later to attack using new methods. However, the difference today is that the political and security conditions have changed, and the Malian army has become more organized and experienced than before.
In the field, no one denies that the situation is difficult, but exaggerating its description serves multiple agendas, some political and some purely media-driven. There are those who want to portray Mali as a country on the brink of collapse, and others who amplify the terrorist threat to justify positions or interventions.
Those living here in Bamako know that the country is going through a delicate phase, but it is not on the verge of falling as claimed.
Another reason that has exacerbated the crisis is the government’s attempt to reorganize the transportation of fuel and goods to the capital. Previously, fuel trucks passed through routes without clear oversight, making them vulnerable to theft or smuggling. Now, authorities have implemented a plan to organize the movement of these trucks, gathering them at specific points before allowing them to move in secured convoys towards the capital.
This process naturally takes time, which has led to delays in fuel delivery at certain times, but it is a necessary step to ensure long-term security and stability.
Although the fuel shortage has impacted daily life, the media’s portrayal of a “complete paralysis” in Bamako is far from the truth. The city remains vibrant, people continue their work, and transportation operates, albeit intermittently.
Here begins the gap I wanted to address. Those following international and regional media coverage of what is happening in Mali might think they are witnessing a collapsing state, or at least one on the verge of complete fall. The same headlines repeat in newspapers and channels: “Al-Qaeda is nearing control of Mali,” “Fuel shortages paralyze life in Bamako,” “Is the military regime living its last days?”
But those living in the capital see that the picture is not so bleak. Yes, there is a real crisis, but people are not living in chaos or panic as some portray.
Anyone familiar with the geography of Mali can confidently assert that these groups do not possess the numerical density or logistical strength necessary to threaten the capital. What they are conducting are sporadic operations on side roads or in limited mountainous areas, aimed at instilling fear and disrupting supply movements.
Unfortunately, the media (both international and regional) often discusses the Malian situation from behind desks or through non-field sources, exaggerating the scene and transforming it from a limited fuel crisis into a comprehensive national tragedy.
Even the talk of a “siege” is not accurate; the capital has not been effectively besieged, and what is occurring is closer to a “partial siege” on some main roads leading to it (such as the Kay-Bamako and Sikasso-Bamako roads), resulting from security and organizational conditions, not from a complete collapse or general chaos as promoted.
The Malian army remains the dominant force in the field, conducting ongoing operations to secure roads and sensitive areas, but securing a network of roads in a vast country like Mali requires time and precise organization.
Therefore, when fuel trucks are delayed in reaching the capital, it is not due to state collapse, but because transportation has become somewhat more complicated. Previously, trucks entered without sufficient oversight, but today there are strict security measures, gathering of trucks from different locations, and organization of their routes before they are allowed to move towards the capital. This process takes time, but it is necessary to ensure road safety and the organized distribution of supplies.
The strategy of siege and attempts to isolate the capital
It is clear that terrorist groups are trying this time to adopt a new approach by attempting to economically strangle the capital, not through direct military attack, but by cutting supply routes and preventing fuel from reaching it. However, this is not the first time these groups have experimented with such tactics.
They previously attempted to burn factories that produced vital materials for the state, but the transitional authorities succeeded in overcoming that phase. The groups also tried to burn maintenance vehicles that were working on repairing main roads, and finally resorted to burning fuel tankers in several areas, in an attempt to create chaos and give the impression that the state is powerless. However, despite this, the crisis has not reached the level of general paralysis, and daily life in cities has not stopped.
In fact, fuel prices in the capital have not risen, remaining at around 775 CFA francs per liter, the same price that was in effect before the crisis. The government has succeeded in maintaining price stability and preventing fuel sales in the black market, which has prevented the crisis from affecting food prices.
Had fuel prices actually risen, the impact would have been evident on food and transportation, but this has not occurred. This proves that the transitional authority was aware of the risks of a price increase, choosing to absorb the shock and control the market rather than leaving it to chaos and speculation.
However, at the same time, some may believe that these groups have partially succeeded in asserting their influence over some main roads leading to the capital, which has indeed caused delays in fuel shipments and created some temporary shortages. However, this step has been a double-edged sword, as it has produced completely opposite results.
Instead of weakening citizens’ confidence in the transitional authorities, it has contributed to renewing popular support for them. People have realized that what the armed groups are doing aims only to destroy the country’s economy and cut off people’s livelihoods, and thus many Malians have expressed their support for the state’s efforts, calling for the need to find an alternative and rapid plan to secure supplies and open roads.
In conclusion, those living in Bamako today do not need reports to know that the crisis is real. However, they also understand that their country has not fallen as rumored. It is true that Mali is suffering, but it is not surrendering. People complain and laugh at the same time. This ability to persist despite everything is what makes this country different.
Perhaps cameras do not capture these small details, but those who live them know their value. At the end of each day, when generators roar to life and the sun sets behind the Niger River, I feel that Bamako—despite its fatigue—remains alive, refusing to be reduced to a news bulletin in a line or a headline.
Mali is not just a fuel crisis or a struggle for influence; it is a story of a people clinging to life no matter how tight the siege becomes, and a city that continues to pulse despite all that is said about it.
In conclusion, the reality of the crisis in Mali today is not merely a fuel crisis or a temporary siege, but part of a broader battle between the state and the groups attempting to destabilize it.
Bamako is not besieged, and Mali has not fallen; rather, it is undergoing a new phase of challenge and testing. The difference between what we see in the streets and what is said on screens is the difference between reality and the media narrative.
Therefore, what is needed today is not just to report the news, but to convey the picture as it is. The media must move beyond alarmist language and listen to the voices of the people in the field—those who continue their lives despite all challenges and who know that the truth is not always as presented on screens.
Mali has faced ongoing security challenges since a coup in 2012, which led to the rise of various armed groups, including those affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The country has since struggled with political instability and violence, particularly in the northern regions.
In recent years, the situation has evolved, with extremist groups attempting to exert influence closer to the capital, Bamako, raising concerns about the potential for increased violence and instability in the region.
The international community has been involved in efforts to stabilize Mali, with various military and humanitarian missions aimed at supporting the government and addressing the root causes of conflict.
