Thabet Al-Amour
What You Need to Know
The ongoing conflict in Sudan between the military and the Rapid Support Forces has drawn significant external involvement, particularly from Ethiopia. A recent investigation revealed Ethiopia’s role in training RSF fighters, raising questions about regional stability and the implications for Sudan’s internal dynamics and foreign relations.
Africa-Press. In understanding the equations of internal conflicts, a significant hypothesis emerges: if the conflict is between the state – the army – and one of its components, it cannot continue without a decisive resolution for an open-ended period. This is precisely what has occurred in Sudan. How has the battle between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces remained unresolved for over two years? This suggests external intervention and support.
The hypothesis that external parties have entered and intervened in the ongoing conflict in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces since April 2023 was confirmed by an investigation conducted by a local source from Nairobi on February 10, 2026. It revealed that Ethiopia hosts a camp training thousands of Rapid Support Forces fighters, indicating that the ongoing conflict in Sudan has attracted other regional actors who support the continuation of the struggle.
The investigation unveiled by the local source revealed a series of facts, serving as the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in the civil war in Sudan. The investigation also hinted at the UAE’s involvement, suggesting that funding and support for the camp come from the UAE. The investigation concludes that the continuation of the conflict would not have persisted without the intervention and involvement of external parties, raising several questions, including why Ethiopia hosts a camp to train the Rapid Support Forces and what this means for Sudan-Ethiopia relations and the realities of internal conflicts in Africa.
The investigation provided documented information supported by evidence and images detailing the construction of the base, the funding entity, and the training operations taking place there. Satellite images reveal the camp’s location in a remote forest area in the “Menge” district, just 32 km from the Sudanese border, in a sensitive geographical triangle linking Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan. The investigation discussed the pivotal role of “Asosa” airport, which has become a logistical hub for supplying the camp, in addition to establishing ground control platforms for drones, granting the Rapid Support Forces a strategic depth they previously lacked.
The local source reported that it spoke to 15 informed sources regarding the camp’s construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats. A photo taken by a U.S. space technology company on November 24, 2025, showed more than 640 tents in the camp, each approximately four square meters. According to a leaked Ethiopian intelligence cable, about 4,300 personnel were completing their advanced training phases at the beginning of this year.
In a segment that transcends the geography of the African continent, eight sources cited by the investigation, including a senior Ethiopian government official, stated that the UAE financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support for the site, as also indicated in an internal memo from Ethiopian security agencies and a diplomatic cable reviewed by the local source.
This indicates that there are external African and non-African parties involved in the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and what appears to be an internal conflict among Sudanese factions is, in fact, a proxy war crossing the borders of Sudan and Africa.
The existence of a training camp for the Rapid Support Forces in Ethiopia means that the internal conflict in Sudan has become a proxy war crossing borders, and it signifies that Sudan has become a forward pivot in the equation of regional security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This is one of the consequences of Sudan’s geographical location, linking East Africa to its northern regions, in addition to its maritime borders.
The local source’s investigation indicates that there is unlimited external support intertwined in the depth of the conflict, which does not merely aim to resolve the confrontation in favor of one party but also seeks to reshape the regional system in the area. A network of interests has formed across African borders due to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which has now become a proxy struggle.
Ethiopia’s involvement in the conflict among Sudanese factions is not a recent development that emerged with the local source’s investigation; rather, it reveals that Ethiopia has engaged to the extent of partnership and participation, rather than merely providing indirect support and endorsement as it had done previously.
Previous positions taken by Ethiopia indicate that it does not remain neutral. In July 2023, three months into the war, the Ethiopian Prime Minister stated that “Sudan is suffering from a leadership vacuum,” hinting at the necessity of imposing a no-fly zone and the intervention of international forces.
In a notable development, the Prime Minister hosted the leader of the Rapid Support Forces, “Hemeti,” in December 2023, with official ceremonies and a guard of honor in Addis Ababa. The Prime Minister deliberately shared images of his meeting with “Hemeti” and his accompanying delegation around a dining table, which was interpreted at the time as Ethiopia granting “Hemeti” some legitimacy.
The determinants of the existence of a training camp for the Rapid Support Forces in Ethiopia imply that there is an Ethiopian intention to resolve the Fashaga file, one of the main points of tension between Khartoum and Addis Ababa. It indicates that Ethiopia aims to solidify the equation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in any upcoming negotiations, which is possible if Ethiopia disrupts any Egyptian-Sudanese rapprochement.
Thus, distracting Sudan with the conflict against the Rapid Support Forces enhances Ethiopia’s position if it decides to negotiate regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. For this reason, Ethiopia has made significant strides in coordinating with the Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese army, solidifying its choice regarding the war in Sudan.
Ethiopia’s calculations here are based on the bet that the Rapid Support Forces can resolve the conflict in their favor. Achieving this would mean a new positioning for Ethiopia as a regional player, and it seems that Ethiopia has overlooked the repercussions of directly entering the depth of the conflict in Sudan and the implications it entails on an African, Arab, and international level.
What Ethiopia has done elevates the level of conflict from within Sudan to the broader African region and may extend to the Middle East. In one of its facets, it disrupts international mediation efforts and undermines a legal international framework that criminalizes states and prohibits them from interfering in each other’s affairs.
It appears that the repercussions have indeed begun to unfold, as the U.S. Congress has entered the fray regarding the outcomes of the local source’s investigation, threatening sanctions and freezing arms deals that have affected the UAE.
The accusations presented in the investigation will lead to a deterioration of trust among neighboring countries, reflecting on national security in the Horn of Africa and threatening regional stability. It will open the door for a rebalancing of alliances and alignments, particularly concerning water issues in general and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in particular. Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s conflict could prompt Sudan to intervene in Ethiopia through the Tigray region and may extend to neighboring countries like Somalia, Eritrea, and others on the brink of conflicts.
In conclusion, the local source’s investigation reveals that the conflict in Sudan would not have persisted without external intervention, support, and involvement of foreign powers. It also indicates that claims of neutrality by some countries do not mean they are uninvolved. The Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads of pivotal and central transformations, indicating an intertwining of internal conflicts and external interests, particularly concerning water and border issues. It suggests that Ethiopia’s ambitions and interests could lead to risks and consequences that extend the conflict beyond the borders of the Horn of Africa.
