Elhamy El-Meligi, Egyptian journalist
Africa-Press. Some relationships do not reveal their absence through the calmness of days, but rather through moments of danger. When the region ignited, and flames spread from its skies to its maritime passages, energy markets, and the tables of its peoples, a paradox emerged that is difficult to defend: Cairo was present in efforts to halt the war on Iran, in bridging distances between Tehran and Washington, and in seeking an exit to prevent the region from falling into the abyss, while its official relations with Tehran remained at the threshold of “interest management.”
The phone calls between the foreign ministers were more regular than flights between the two capitals, and the Egyptian mediation was deeper than the level of diplomatic representation; it was as if the two countries were jointly managing the dangers of a region on the brink of explosion, yet they remained unable to manage their relationship in a manner befitting their significance.
This is not a mere protocol paradox, nor a disagreement over a diplomatic title or a plaque raised above a building. It is a gap between what geography imposes and what old calculations allow, between the role Egypt actually plays and the position it ought to occupy. Events have surpassed the old question: Will Egyptian-Iranian relations return? The more pressing question now is: How long can Cairo and Tehran bear the cost of this absence?
From the perplexing question to the necessity of decision
Since I wrote in the Egyptian “Youm7” in 2016 an article titled “Egypt and Iran: Questions and Determinants,” I have seen that the longest rift in the history of the two countries can no longer be explained by the logic of interests. I revisited the question in “Al-Mayadeen” in 2022 under the title “Egypt and Iran: The Perplexing Question,” and then pushed the idea a step further in 2024 in an article titled “Egypt and Iran: An Alliance of Necessity in the Face of Regional Crises,” before finally addressing the need for an Arab-Iranian dialogue that does not escape history nor become a prisoner of it.
This call was not an admiration for Iran, nor a demand for Egypt to shift from one axis to another. It was an attempt to read Egyptian interests as shaped by geography and tested by crises: a state the size of Egypt should not view Iran through the eyes of others, nor manage its relationship with it from the window of a third capital, nor leave such a large space for indirect messages.
This vision received approval from Egyptian and Iranian elites, from Egyptian figures in positions of responsibility, and from Egyptian diplomats who previously worked in Tehran and knew Iran as a society, state, and institutions, not just a rigid image created by years of hostility. I did not read this as praise for a personal stance, but as an indication of a growing awareness that normal relations with Iran are not a gift to Tehran, but rather a restoration of a tool of Egyptian power.
Countries do not establish relations as a reward for agreement, nor sever them as punishment for disagreement. Diplomatic relations were originally established to manage contradictions and prevent them from turning into conflict. Egypt maintains full relations with countries it disagrees with on issues directly affecting its national security; why should Iran alone be an eternal exception?
When the war bill reached Cairo
The crises of 2026 proved that the war on Iran does not remain within its borders, and that the conflict in the Gulf does not stop at its shores. Every missile launched, every tanker stopped, and every threat that extends to energy passages echoes in Cairo in the form of rising fuel, food, and fertilizer prices, increased transportation and insurance costs, pressure on the budget, and disruption in trade and the Suez Canal.
Thus, geography once again declared that Egypt’s economic security is not a separate island from Gulf security, and that Iran’s stability is not merely an internal Iranian affair, just as the security and sovereignty of Arab countries are not matters Tehran has the right to ignore.
In the midst of danger, Cairo acted as befits a state that understands that the collapse of balance will affect it before the clouds of smoke dissipate. It conducted intensive communications, contributed to bridging viewpoints, supported the negotiation process, and called for a regional dialogue that addresses the concerns of all parties according to the principles of good neighborliness and international law.
The Iranian side expressed its appreciation for the Egyptian role in overcoming obstacles and reducing escalation. Here, the paradox emerges in its clearest form: If Egypt is qualified to contribute to preventing war between Iran and the United States, how can it not be qualified to build a complete relationship with Iran itself? If Tehran trusts Cairo as a messenger of messages and a close party to viewpoints, why does this trust stop at the limits of mediation and not transform into an institutional political relationship?
Concerns that the rift does not dispel
However, the call to restore relations should not turn into a celebratory discourse that ignores the reasons for Egyptian and Arab anxiety. Solid relationships are not built on burying differences under phrases of politeness, but on the ability to name them and place them on the table.
In this context, I recall a conversation I had with one of the Egyptian officials concerned with national security, who presented some of the Egyptian reservations regarding Iranian policy. The essence of his vision was that a significant part of Iranian influence in Iraq was built, according to his assessment, through politicizing Shiite identity and linking it to the concept of the guardianship of the jurist, and that there is a fear in Cairo of attempts to exploit religious ties and the love of the family of the Prophet to open political or sectarian avenues of influence within Egypt.
I do not invoke this assessment as a final judgment on Iranian intentions, nor as an officially declared stance of the state, but rather because it reveals the nature of concerns present within some of its institutions, which cannot be denied or mocked. Egypt, with its historical composition, its Al-Azhar reference, and its firm concept of the nation-state, is highly sensitive to any activity that could be understood as infringing on its sectarian unity or turning religion into a tool of political influence across borders.
However, fears are not death sentences, and they should not become a justification for an endless rift. The path to dispelling them does not pass through closing embassies, but through an official dialogue that distinguishes between legitimate cultural and religious exchange and the political exploitation of sectarianism, and establishes mutual guarantees that protect the uniqueness of both societies and the sovereignty of both states.
Tehran must understand that respecting the Egyptian state begins with respecting the choices of its people and the revolution of June 30, and ceasing any rhetoric that could be interpreted as support for the Brotherhood or interference in Egyptian affairs. Furthermore, the discourse on state sovereignty does not align with supporting armed forces that contest state institutions’ decisions on war and peace, or with using media and sectarianism as tools for political influence.
Conversely, some Egyptian and Arab circles must stop treating Iran as an enemy by virtue of identity. We have the right to disagree with its regime and policies, and to reject any interference in Arab affairs, but we do not have the right to replace a real enemy that occupies land, kills the Palestinian people, and threatens the countries of the region, with a regional neighbor with whom we share contradictions that can be subjected to the rules of politics.
Palestine and the missing compass
The American-Zionist project has been the biggest beneficiary of turning Iran into the primary danger in Arab consciousness; the more the image of the “Iranian enemy” advances, the more the image of the Zionist occupier retreats, arms markets expand, the need for foreign bases is enhanced, and normalization finds its way into consciousness before reaching agreements.
This does not mean ignoring the disagreement between Egypt and Iran over some tools of supporting resistance or the limits of the roles of armed forces. However, it means that Cairo and Tehran can build a common space that prevents the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, rejects displacement, protects the unity of Palestinian territories, and redirects the compass of the region towards the real source of danger: occupation and the expansionist Zionist project.
The relationship with Iran should not be measured by how much it grants Tehran, but by how much Egypt regains its ability to influence issues in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf, and how much it closes off avenues for turning the Arab-Iranian divide into a bridge for American hegemony and Zionist arrogance.
From crisis management to building interests
The first step does not require complex philosophy: raising the level of diplomatic representation and exchanging ambassadors. The density of communications and meetings has surpassed the “interest management” format, and its continuation has become less than the political reality itself.
Then comes the launch of a permanent strategic dialogue between the institutions of the two states, which is not summoned when war ignites and then folded when the fires extinguish, but regularly discusses issues of Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, the Red Sea, the Gulf, maritime and energy security, the nuclear file, and the future of the regional system.
Both countries need a principles document to regulate the relationship: respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, rejection of the use of sectarianism or media as tools of influence, and not supporting any activity targeting the security of the other state, and rejecting the transformation of the region’s territories into platforms for mutual aggression. Sovereignty is indivisible; it protects Arab countries from Iranian missiles, just as it obliges them not to turn their territories into bases for striking Iran.
Economically, they can start with sectors not subject to sanctions; from medicine, agriculture, food industries, petrochemicals, to transportation, tourism, and medical services, while establishing disciplined financial and legal channels that protect the Egyptian economy and respect its international commitments.
Culturally, the two countries do not need to invent a shared memory; the memory exists and has resisted politics for centuries: Omar Khayyam in the voice of Umm Kulthum, Sheikh Mustafa Ismail in the Iranian consciousness, and “Nahj al-Balagha” explained by Muhammad Abduh, and Persian heritage revived by the Bulaq Press. What is required is not to leave these bridges hostage to propaganda or sectarian exploitation, but to transform them into academic, artistic, and cultural exchanges that redefine each people to the other away from images of fear.
The relationship with Iran is not against the Gulf
Some treat any Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement as a detriment to Egypt’s Arab credit or a threat to its Gulf relations. This is a false equation; Gulf security is part of Egypt’s national security, but it is not preserved by turning the region into a permanent frontline, but by establishing a balance that protects sovereignty and prevents war.
Gulf countries have reopened their channels with Tehran, realizing that direct dialogue is less costly than a struggle of messages and mediators. Egypt does not need to choose between the Gulf and Iran; rather, it can, by virtue of its Arab weight and its distance from sectarian sensitivities, be a bridge between them, and propose a concept of regional security that does not rely on Iranian hegemony, nor on American protection, nor accept turning the Zionist entity into the policeman of the region.
When absence becomes a stance
Egypt and Iran do not need a political love story, nor an alliance that erases their differences, nor a prior agreement on all regional files. They need the courage to acknowledge that the rift has not ended the disagreement, but left it unmanaged; it has not protected national security, but reduced each party’s ability to understand and influence the other; it has not isolated Iran, but has obscured Egypt from a space it should have been present in with its weight and history.
Cairo has proven that it can talk to Tehran when the channels of others are cut off, and that it possesses the credibility and trustworthiness to contribute to stopping the war. However, mediation, no matter how important, remains a management of the moment of danger, while a complete relationship is an investment in preventing danger before it occurs.
It is time to move from “interest management” to a partnership of interests; a relationship that does not require Egypt to abandon its Arab identity, nor grants Iran the right to interfere in the Arab sphere, but obliges both states to the rules of neighborhood, parity, and sovereignty, and restores to both the ability to participate in writing the future of the region instead of waiting for what Washington and the Zionist entity write for them.
For when absence is prolonged, it is no longer neutrality, but rather becomes a stance; and when the doors of diplomacy are closed, disagreements do not disappear, but seek windows through which wars enter. History, in the end, does not ask why the arrival of ambassadors was delayed; it only records the names of those who kept the door closed, until the fire entered through the windows.
