By Thabit Al-Amour, Researcher in Political Science and International Relations
A new variable has emerged in the ongoing conflict in Sudan since April 2023: the escalation of divisions within the Rapid Support Forces and the defection of some of its members to the Sudanese Armed Forces. This raises the question: why have these divisions occurred within the Rapid Support Forces? What are their causes, implications, and effects on the future of the ongoing war in Sudan?
In a conflict characterized by a zero-sum military outcome, and at a time when the Sudanese Armed Forces announced their control over new areas in North Kordofan and several drones belonging to the Rapid Support Forces, a new group of about 45 fighters from the Rapid Support Forces announced their defection and joining the army on July 31, 2026. This defector group included, in addition to their soldiers’ equipment, modern military vehicles and heavy weapons, along with several military leaders, most notably Othman Al-Nour, Younis Idris, and Ali Al-Zain, who are senior leaders of the Rapid Support Forces from the city of Bara in North Kordofan.
This was not the only defection, and according to available data, it will not be the last. On July 23, 2026, a group of 280 fighters from the Rapid Support Forces, including field commanders, defected and announced their allegiance to the Sudanese army, reaching Khartoum in a process described as secretive.
The divisions within the Rapid Support Forces are not a recent phenomenon; they have been expanding for two years. Several field leaders have defected and joined the army, and some military formations have changed their allegiances and turned against their alliances with the Rapid Support Forces. One of the most significant transformations occurred in October 2024 when the commander of the “Sudan Shield” forces announced the end of his alliance with the Rapid Support Forces and his joining the army.
The year 2026 witnessed a series of defections and the exit of prominent leaders, including Brigadier Ali Rizq Allah, known as “Al-Safna,” who defected from the Rapid Support Forces and joined the army, as well as Major General Nour Ahmed Adam, known as “Al-Nour Al-Quba,” who is considered one of the most prominent field commanders in the battles of El Fasher, who joined the army in April 2026. He was followed by field commander Bishara Al-Hawira, who left the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces in North Kordofan.
It is noteworthy that the commander of the Sudanese army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, announced that anyone who leaves the fighting and joins the side of the state can have their situation reviewed, which has reinforced the trend of defections within the Rapid Support Forces. This has marked a shift in the dynamics of the ongoing conflict, signaling a new phase of the war among factions, characterized by the fragmentation of the Rapid Support Forces and their defections, in contrast to the cohesion of the army and its maintenance of internal unity and relationships with the popular base, while the presence of the Rapid Support Forces’ base has diminished.
The significance of the defections within the Rapid Support Forces lies not only in the number of fighters joining the army and their ranks but also in their implications for changing the mood within those forces, especially those operating in Kordofan. The continuation of military operations is linked to the ability to secure supply routes between Darfur and central Sudan.
Thus, any defections in these areas will have an impact that goes beyond mere numbers to include logistical and military dimensions. The continuation of defections indicates that the Rapid Support Forces’ plans to lead Sudan into chaos and rebellion have failed and are nearing their end, which will have repercussions and implications for the future of the ongoing war in Sudan.
The reasons for the defections are varied, but they all converge on the conclusion that the Sudanese army has succeeded in its strategy to confront the rebellion led by the Rapid Support Forces. No militia, regardless of the support and funding it receives, can defeat the people’s army in the country; while the army fights to defend the country and its people, the Rapid Support Forces fight for their own interests. While the Rapid Support Forces commit war crimes and acts of genocide, the Sudanese army maintains the popular base. While the Sudanese army fights with what it has left of local and national capabilities, the Rapid Support Forces receive external support in terms of equipment and armament through air bridges aimed at exhausting the army and dismantling Sudan.
The ongoing paths of war in Sudan and the anticipation of their outcomes are no longer solely dependent on defections; they have also extended to resignations. On June 17, 2026, one of the prominent leaders of the “Foundation” alliance, Faris Al-Nour, announced his resignation from all his positions in the Rapid Support Forces and the political alliance supporting them. The significance of this resignation does not stem only from the position he held within the alliance, as he was a member of the Presidential Council of the “Foundation” alliance; he was appointed governor of Khartoum State and served as an advisor to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo “Hemedti.” He was considered one of the most prominent political figures associated with the political project that the Rapid Support Forces sought to establish alongside their military activity, which gives his resignation political dimensions that exceed direct military impacts.
The ongoing defections within the Rapid Support Forces and their expansion to include field leaders will have repercussions on the course of the war and its future in Sudan. This assessment does not rely solely on the magnitude of the impact or the number of defectors and their locations and their ability to withdraw their forces and equipment with them, but rather on the fact that defections are widening, especially in recent months, which indicates a weakening of the structural and organizational cohesion within the Rapid Support Forces. This will lead to a decline in coordination among its components and leaders, the infiltration of doubt among commanders and fighters, and the loss of equipment and forces to the army’s control, as any disintegration of the Rapid Support Forces means the army’s control over that front.
While this does not mean that the war is nearing its end or a swift resolution, it does indicate that the circumstances of the war have changed. While the army remains cohesive, the Rapid Support Forces are disintegrating; while the morale of the army rises, the morale of the Rapid Support Forces is collapsing.
The defections within the Rapid Support Forces are expanding, but so far they are primarily individual defections, even if they are leadership-level. Their continuation will affect the course of the war, but it is not solely the defections that will end the war; there are other influential factors such as the ability to compensate for human resources, organize ranks, the size of the remaining Rapid Support Forces, supply lines, external support through air bridges, and the image and narrative of the Rapid Support Forces that have deteriorated domestically and internationally due to the crimes they commit.
The rise in defections within the Rapid Support Forces indicates that this is not merely a series of isolated incidents or personal assessments, even if they appear individual. In the long run, if this continues, it will lead to exhaustion and erosion within the structure and organization of the Rapid Support Forces, especially since some of the defections are based on tribal dimensions, indicating that social support and backing have closed their doors to the Rapid Support Forces. This is because loyalties to tribe and interests take precedence over the cause or the ranks they stand in, which will lead to significant human losses in the Rapid Support Forces that rely on tribal and clan alliances, unlike the army, which relies on military doctrine and national loyalties.
In addition to the defections, there is a noticeable erosion of the popular base. The widespread and heinous violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces against civilians have led to a state of popular rejection and political isolation, prompting some educated or politically affiliated leaders close to the Rapid Support Forces to jump ship to protect themselves from international prosecution and sanctions.
The defections within the Rapid Support Forces will not resolve the war quickly and immediately, but they will have a field and moral impact in favor of the Sudanese army. However, there is also another unspoken aspect: the fragmentation and disintegration of the Rapid Support Forces into local warlords and groups will lead to a multi-party conflict that is difficult to control or put an end to, and its outcomes cannot be predicted.
Thus, instead of the war being limited to a confrontation between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, it may evolve into a civil war that plunges Sudan into new local, regional, and tribal conflicts over resources and power.
In conclusion, states cannot rely on militias, as at a certain moment of state weakness or distraction, these militias will pounce on the state and its army, which is precisely what is happening in Sudan. The ongoing successive defections within the Rapid Support Forces demonstrate that betting on militias, whether internally or externally, to resolve the conflict means that the outcome is zero-sum; these militias often end up in divisions and splits, and perhaps even turning against each other.
Today, Sudan stands at a crossroads with two paths: either the divisions within the Rapid Support Forces will expand and escalate, leading to a resolution of the conflict in favor of the army and the state, or they will lead to a new phase of decentralized conflicts and civil war.