Africa-Press. The crisis of migration flows towards the Spanish city of Ceuta has brought the issue of Moroccan-Spanish relations back to the forefront of political discussion, as circles in Madrid began exploring pressure tools that could be used in the event of renewed border crises between the two countries. There is talk of potentially resorting to the energy sector as one of the most significant areas of economic interconnection between Rabat and Madrid.
A local source reported that the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez requested data from institutions and companies operating in the energy sector regarding the nature of exchanges with Morocco, as part of studying the options available to the Spanish government in the event of new crises related to migration.
This move, if confirmed by the report, indicates that the energy file is starting to play a clearer role in the political calculations of relations between the two countries, after cooperation in this area had been one of the most prominent aspects of rapprochement seen in Moroccan-Spanish relations in recent years.
Interconnectedness Difficult to Separate
Morocco holds increasing importance for the Spanish energy sector, while Spain has become a significant source of energy for the kingdom.
According to the data provided in the report, Morocco imported approximately 4,000 gigawatt-hours of Spanish natural gas since the beginning of the year, while oil exchanges with the kingdom accounted for about 14% of Spain’s exports during the first half of the year.
In the electricity sector, Spain’s exports to Morocco reached about 827 megawatts during the period from August 1 to 19, reflecting the extent of mutual dependence between the energy networks of the two countries.
This relationship is not limited to traditional energy trade, as Spain and Morocco are linked by a network of economic interests, investments, and infrastructure projects, making any political decision targeting the energy sector likely to have repercussions that extend beyond the targeted party to the state that uses it as a pressure tool.
Thus, turning energy into a tool for confrontation may not be an easy decision for Madrid, especially given the reliance of Spanish companies on the Moroccan market and the presence of joint investments and projects across various sectors.
Double-Edged Sword
While the local source discussed Sanchez’s request for information regarding energy exchanges, official Spanish sources downplayed the possibility of a new plan to use energy as a weapon against Morocco.
These sources argue that the existing interconnection between the two countries makes it difficult to treat energy as a one-way pressure card.
In Morocco, sources considered this potential option a “double-edged sword,” noting that any disruption in energy flows could have repercussions for both parties.
The sources recalled Morocco’s role in supporting the reactivation of the Spanish electricity grid following a widespread power outage that occurred in Spain in 2025, indicating that the relationship between the two countries is not solely based on Spanish exports to Morocco but also includes mutual interests that could become more significant during crises.
This means that using energy as a political pressure card could lead to counterproductive outcomes, especially if it prompts Rabat and Madrid to accelerate plans to reduce mutual dependence rather than address the underlying causes of political disputes.
Migration Reassesses Partnership
These developments come in the wake of the migration crisis linked to Ceuta, which has once again highlighted the fragility of security arrangements between Morocco and Spain.
In recent years, migration has become one of the most sensitive issues in the relationship between the two countries, as Madrid relies heavily on Moroccan cooperation in border monitoring, combating human trafficking networks, and limiting the arrival of migrants to Spanish territory.
Conversely, Morocco’s ability to control its borders is an important card in its relationship with Spain and the European Union, especially since any significant increase in the number of migrants could place the Spanish government under internal political and security pressure.
Thus, the Ceuta crisis is not viewed in Madrid merely as a migration crisis but as a test of the effectiveness of the security partnership with Rabat.
Previous crises have shown that Moroccan-Spanish relations can quickly shift from cooperation to tension before returning to a path of rapprochement when both parties recognize the extent of their mutual interests.
22 Billion Euros in Trade
The scale of economic relations makes it difficult for either country to turn political disputes into open economic confrontations.
The volume of trade exchanges between Morocco and Spain exceeded 22 billion euros in 2025, while Spanish companies continue to secure major projects in Morocco.
These interests form a vast network of connections encompassing trade, industry, energy, transport, infrastructure, tourism, and investments.
Therefore, any extensive use of energy as a political weapon could impact Spanish companies operating in Morocco, as well as affect energy supplies in the Moroccan market and increase costs for consumers and businesses.
Moreover, Spain views Morocco as an important economic partner and a gateway to African markets, while the European Union, particularly Spain, represents one of Morocco’s most important trading partners.
Could Energy Become a Negotiation Tool?
In light of this equation, the aim of gathering data on energy exchanges may not be to prepare a plan to cut supplies but rather to understand the extent of mutual vulnerabilities and dependencies of both parties, paving the way for its use in negotiations or managing future crises.
Possessing information about sources of gas, electricity, and the volume of oil trade allows the Spanish government to estimate the cost of any potential action, identify the most affected sectors, and assess Morocco’s ability to find alternatives.
Conversely, Morocco can leverage its relationships with European markets, its geographical position, and the network of foreign company interests as a negotiating card in the event of escalating disputes.
Thus, the energy card may be closer to a deterrent and negotiation tool than an immediately usable economic weapon.
New Test for Relations
The Ceuta crisis places Moroccan-Spanish relations before a new test, not only at the level of borders and migration but also concerning the economic interests that have underpinned rapprochement between the two countries in recent years.
If Rabat and Madrid succeed in containing the migration crisis, it is likely that energy will remain a field for cooperation, especially given the shared economic interests.
However, if disputes escalate and migration becomes a mutual pressure tool, other files, such as energy, trade, and investments, may enter the realm of political conflict.
In this case, the problem would be that the interconnection that made Morocco and Spain economic partners could simultaneously become a source of mutual pressure.
Therefore, the mere fact that Madrid is examining the extent of its dependence on Morocco and vice versa in the energy sector reveals that the Ceuta crisis has transcended the boundaries of migration and has become part of a broader equation testing Spain’s ability to utilize its economic cards while Rabat seeks to protect a strategic partnership that does not seem ready to turn into an open confrontation.
