What You Need to Know
Analysts assert that while war between Egypt and Ethiopia is not inevitable, it remains a potential outcome if diplomatic efforts fail. Egypt has set new red lines regarding governance and security in the Red Sea, amid escalating regional tensions. Experts emphasize the importance of peaceful solutions and regional cooperation.
Africa-Press. Analysts have confirmed that war between Egypt and Ethiopia is not an “inevitable fate,” but it remains one of the scenarios if diplomatic paths fail. This comes as Cairo has announced new red lines concerning governance and security in the Red Sea, amid rising regional tensions.
During the program “Al-Masaiya” on a local channel, military academy fellow Dr. Said Ghoneim explained that the option of war remains theoretically on the table if the political horizon becomes blocked. However, he emphasized that Egypt considers it the “last resort” and has historically preferred peaceful solutions, citing the decades-long issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without slipping into military confrontation.
On her part, Dr. Amani Al-Tawil, director of the African program at the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, noted that recent Egyptian statements regarding the Red Sea come in the context of Ethiopian moves aimed at gaining a sovereign maritime outlet, which Cairo rejects based on the principle that the Red Sea belongs to the bordering states, according to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Al-Tawil clarified that although Ethiopia is a landlocked country, it has the right to benefit from ports through legal arrangements, but it does not have the right to a “sovereign foothold” on the Red Sea. She pointed out that any change in the current balances could increase the region’s fragility, especially given the complex situations in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia and Eritrea.
She also highlighted that Ethiopian moves, including its previous agreement with the Somaliland region, have raised regional suspicions regarding intentions, asserting that the Red Sea is already under military and security pressures and cannot bear new factors that could lead to further militarization.
Ghoneim reiterated that Egypt’s stance on Ethiopia’s membership in Red Sea coalitions is not new, recalling Cairo’s rejection of Addis Ababa’s joining the Red Sea coastal states association for years. He noted that Ethiopia’s rebuilding of its naval forces and calling on international powers for training heighten fears of additional militarization of a corridor described as one of the most strategically sensitive in the world.
Regarding the possibility of direct military escalation if Ethiopia secures a maritime foothold, Ghoneim believes that Egypt will not allow arrangements that threaten its national security or disrupt the balances in the Red Sea. However, he reiterated that resorting to force remains the least likely option as long as political and diplomatic channels are available.
As for the chances of containing tensions, Amani Al-Tawil ruled out a near breakthrough, considering that the scene is governed by intertwined regional equations that require Arab consensus first to re-engineer relations with the Horn of Africa, alongside addressing what she described as the internal pressures facing Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, which may push him to adopt external issues to bolster his internal position.
The tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia have historical roots, particularly concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and water rights. Egypt relies heavily on the Nile for its water supply, while Ethiopia seeks to harness the river’s resources for development. This conflict has been exacerbated by Ethiopia’s ambitions to establish a maritime foothold in the Red Sea, which Egypt vehemently opposes, citing international law and regional stability.
